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ABSTRACT 
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA 
by Rebecca Nell Woodrick 
May 2009 
This study analyzed an educational organization's crisis communication with its 
employees regarding the devastation caused to the organization and to employees by 
hurricane Katrina in 2005. This study drew upon literature regarding communication in 
crisis and in particular, natural disaster crisis, to ascertain to what degree employees felt 
the organization engaged in characteristics of High Reliability Organizations. A case 
study approach employing both qualitative and quantitative data was utilized. 
The data revealed that the organization was perceived by employees has having 
adequately communicated before and after Katrina. Data further revealed that the 
organization engages in behaviors consistent with practices of High Reliability 
Organizations. This study was designed to add to a limited body of knowledge regarding 
effective crisis communication practices of employers with employees during natural 
disasters. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizations depend on communication for survival. It is not a far reach to 
describe communication as the lifeblood of an organization. The day-to-day operation of 
an organization, whether for-profit or not-for-profit in nature, depends upon a constant 
flow of effective communicative interactions from employee to customer, employee to 
employee, organization to the public, and in numerous other dyads which further 
illustrate the necessity to communicate effectively within an organization. How 
communication occurs outside the confines of the day-to-day routine becomes of 
paramount importance to the organization's survival when crisis occurs. What is 
communicated during and after a crisis, and to whom, can determine whether or not the 
organization survives, and if so, whether or not it will be perceived as viable, post-crisis. 
Organizations experience crisis in multiple forms. In the most general terms, 
organizations encounter crises in the same ways as individuals: crises which are a 
function of human behavior, or crises that are a function of nature, the "act of God" 
variety. Within these very broad categories one finds a plethora of types: man-made 
crises that are a function of human mental error, for example, or man-made crises created 
as an act of deliberate harm. What distinguishes natural disasters from man-made 
disasters? Further, what difference does such a distinction make to an organization? An 
understanding of the basic differences is key as one analyzes communication in times of 
crisis. 
In the most general terms, disasters arise from events of an environmental nature 
- i.e., acts of God - whereas crises are based in human error combined with outside 
influences, whether of the physical or social environment. Kreps (1984) provided a 
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sociological basis for teasing out these nuances when he suggested that disasters are 
community-based events that, as a ripple effect, in turn create crises in organizations that 
comprise the community. For example, an earthquake creates disaster in a town. 
Organizations that must respond to that disaster, in turn, experience crisis as a response. 
They must respond to what is created when disaster meets design: the natural event 
informs the design which the organization has created to enact a response. This 
sociological perspective implies a distinction between disaster as an event-of-nature 
which spawns crises within organizations, whether organization is perceived as an 
incorporated community, a disaster response entity, or a for-profit corporation. 
Quarantelli (1988) distinguished natural disaster from organizational disaster when he 
categorized natural disasters as collective stress situations that have community-wide 
impact, with community serving as a sociological term akin to Kreps'. In other words, 
like Kreps, Quarantelli's research focused on the need to examine organizational 
response to community disaster. Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998) further delineated 
natural disaster from man-made disaster by reframing organizational disaster as 
organizational crisis, based on the assumption that natural disasters are a function of 
nature's hand, so to speak, not human hand. 
The nature of a natural disaster-created crisis varies in significant ways from 
crises created as an outgrowth of human behavior. In most basic terms, natural disaster 
crises are uncontrollable. Humans do not possess the capacity to control Hurricanes, 
floods, tornados, or earthquakes. Humans - organizations - can only control response to 
such. An organization in crisis due to a natural disaster must negotiate a unique set of 
challenges, and must, do so in a way that will provide the greatest chance for 
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organizational survival. In the wake of natural disaster-related crises, the very survival of 
one's employment force takes on paramount importance. 
Within organizations, then, the way in which the crisis is addressed will be 
significantly informed by the man-made or act-of-God nature of the crisis. This research 
project explores the communicative challenges an organizations faces during natural 
disaster crisis, to what degree significant differences exist in response types in this 
circumstance, and how organizations may most effectively communicate with members 
during times of natural disaster crises. Additionally, this study will apply the High 
Reliability Organization perception scale to an organization that survived a natural 
disaster crisis, to ascertain the degree to which crisis communication affects employee 
perceptions of efficacy and reliability. 
On August 29, 2005, category 5 Hurricane Katrina hit the United States Gulf 
Coast, with the brunt of its force hitting the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana. The President's Report on the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina 
(Townsend, 2006) provided details that help capture the enormity of the disaster. By the 
time the Hurricane was downgraded to lower levels of intensity, then to tropical storm 
status and finally into floods and tornados, 1,300 people had lost their lives. Beyond the 
loss of life, entire communities disappeared, levees in New Orleans, Louisiana broke and 
flooded the entire Ninth Ward district, and economic devastation reached the billion 
dollar mark. The scope of life, property, and economic loss continues to be assessed. 
Explanations regarding why Hurricane Katrina exacted such a high cost in human 
life and livelihood likely will be debated for years to come, with blame assigned and yet 
culpability never fully determined. Historians will analyze what factors led to tangible 
and psychological inadequacies that rendered hundreds of thousands of citizens helpless 
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in the face of the natural disaster that was Katrina. However, what is not debatable, but 
simply stands on fact, is the magnitude and scope of the Hurricane itself. 
Hurricane Katrina packed winds of up to 130 miles per hour, created wind surges 
of 27 feet, and ultimately impacted square footage roughly the size of Great Britain. In 
Mississippi alone, almost 80 miles of coastal property were destroyed. The resulting 
floods and wind damage caused a loss of life in the greater New Orleans metropolitan 
area of approximately 1,100 lives. Of the 1,100 killed, the vast majority consisted of the 
elderly, the infirm, and the poor. Beyond the approximately 1,100 persons known to 
have died as a result of Hurricane Katrina, as of 18 months after Katrina hit, 
approximately 2,000 people from the Gulf Coast were still reported as missing. This 
almost incomprehensible scope of destruction made Katrina, de facto, the most 
destructive natural disaster in United States history (Townsend, 2006). 
The chaos caused by Hurricane Katrina was not limited to loss of human life and 
of geographical destruction. All communication systems across the three states most 
heavily affected were virtually destroyed or incapacitated for multiple days, even weeks. 
Thirty-eight 911 emergency call centers, along with three million telephone customers' 
land lines, were rendered useless by the Hurricane. Cell phone service proved to be 
sporadic at best; television communication was likewise compromised. Subsequently, 
usual avenues of communication were rendered useless. Therefore, for those business 
organizations in the geographical region affected by Katrina that did survive, 
implementation of effective crisis communication became essential for viability. 
Statistics regarding Hurricane Katrina's impact on the economy of the Gulf Coast 
reflected devastation almost beyond comprehension. Mississippi and Louisiana clearly 
sustained the worst economic blows. The Brookings Institute, one year after Katrina, 
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confirmed that basic infrastructures necessary to conduct business were obliterated (Katz, 
Fellowes, & Mabanta, 2006). Almost 30 miles of vital business route U;S. Highway 90 
along the Mississippi Gulf Coast was destroyed. Bridges that once connected the 
business communities of Biloxi to Ocean Springs, and Pass Christian to Bay St. Louis 
were destroyed (Gulf Coast Business Council, 2007). In New Orleans, the Interstate 10 
bridge between Slidell and New Orleans, a vital traffic link for surrounding states and for 
suburban communities into New Orleans, collapsed. Additionally, for an extended period 
of time, only emergency vehicles could access the Lake Ponchartrain Causeway. 
According to statistics gleaned from the President's "Lessons Learned" team and 
from The Institute for Southern Studies (Kromm, 2006), Hurricane Katrina's blow to the 
economic viability of the Gulf Coast region took the following forms: 
® Destroyed or left uninhabitable 300,000 homes; 
• Created an overall estimate of damage totaling $200 billion; 
• Created a drastic increase in unemployment rates in Louisiana and 
Mississippi, from 6% pre-Katrina to 12% immediately after Katrina; 
• Along the Gulf Coast, caused a drop in wages earned by an estimated $1.2 
billion in the third quarter alone of 2005. 
The concept of "lessons learned" from Katrina applied to all facets of life and 
livelihood. Katrina provided the opportunity for virtually every academic discipline of 
scholars to assess and adjust as needed. When one considers the various ways in which 
Hurricane Katrina impacted the Gulf Coast, the painfully obvious common element is 
lack of viable communicative resources. Residents no longer had electricity to access 
key forms of communication, nor roads to travel to work, nor a physical location to 
which to return to work. Within the context of this new reality, the academic discipline 
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of organizational communication had the opportunity to learn lessons. Absent the usual 
avenues of communication, how did organizations attempt communication, how effective 
were those attempts, and what forms of organization communication occurred that 
heretofore had not been used? Scholars of organizational communication may discern 
that an outgrowth of Hurricane Katrina is the opportunity to study communicative 
endeavors, running the gamut from confirming the efficacy of standard practices to 
charting new methods that arose from necessity. 
Organizations typically identify a variety of groups as stakeholders: customers, 
the general public, shareholders, and employees. The form of communication most 
effective for each of these constituencies may vary in times of crisis. The nature of the 
crisis will inform what kind of crisis communication should (or can) be accessed. 
Coombs (1999), for example, illustrated the way in which crisis type drives the decision 
about how, and to whom, communication will be disseminated. Coombs generalized 
organizational crisis type into the two categories of man-made and natural disaster. His 
typology of man-made crises, however, included eight specific areas: malevolence, 
technical breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, mega damage, organizational 
misdeeds, workplace violence, and rumors. Within the realm of these eight typologies, 
much research exists in the area of effective crisis communication with each of the 
constituencies identified above, save one: communication with employees. What 
distinguishes natural disasters from man-made disasters? Further, what difference does 
such a distinction make? An understanding of the basic differences is key as one 
analyzes communication in times of crisis. In the most general terms, disasters arise from 
events of an environmental nature - i.e., acts of God - whereas crises are based in human 
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A dearth of information exists across the significant areas of scholarly research 
regarding effective crisis communication with employees in times of natural disaster-
related crises. The areas of scholarly research that lack extensive employee crisis 
communication studies include communication studies, organizational management, 
public relations, and to some degree, psychology and counseling. Most recently, 
however, in a post-9/11 world, scholarly research has renewed its interest in, and analysis 
of, the "what, why, when and how" of communication with employees in times of crisis, 
whether man-made or of the "act of God" variety. While some differences do exist 
between effective communication with employees in the wake of natural or man-made 
disasters, the depth of research on employee communication in times of natural disasters 
is shallow. An explanation of what we do know about employee communication in the 
wake of man-made disaster and how that knowledge is applicable to natural disaster 
communication is explored in the next chapter. However, this research projects will 
focus only on key aspects of communication with employees around the event of a 
natural disaster-induced organizational crisis. In doing so, the expectation is that we will 
gain insight into what man-made crisis communication is applicable to nature disaster 
communication, as well as discover what forms of communication with employees may 
be uniquely useful for natural disasters. 
The purpose of this study is to determine how a higher education organization in 
the Katrina-affected area was perceived by its employees as having engaged in 
communication with them around the crisis created by Hurricane Katrina. This study will 
further determine to what degree employees of the organization perceived it to be a High 
Reliability Organization (HRO) in the wake of a natural disaster-induced critical incident. 
An HRO is defined as one that operates in a continual high-risk environment, yet does so 
8 
with minimal crisis interruption (Weick, 1988). Organizations that conduct business with 
mindfulness of crisis provide a measure against which less risk-prone organizations can 
be studied. More specifically, HRO's provide a basis for identifying best practices for 
low-risk organizations that find themselves in crisis through not fault of their own. The 
degree to which an organization's employees may perceive it as operating in a state of 
high reliability may base that perception, in part, on communicative efforts. This 
research project seeks to determine if such a correlation exists. Finally, this study will 
determine what factors lead employees to perceive their employer as having successfully 
engaged in organizational learning in the context of a natural disaster- induced critical 
incident. 
The degree to which organizations can learn survival strategies that include 
effective communication with employees holds the potential for economic impact for the 
inevitable future natural disaster crises which the United States and other countries will 
face. Such organizations can serve as a model for other organizations striving to engage 
in organizational learning. This study will add to the limited body of knowledge 
regarding how and why an organization that was directly affected by Hurricane Katrina 
was able to remain functional, and to what degree - and how - they communicated with 
employees, post-crisis. Information gleaned from this study will provide a perspective by 
which to assess efficacy of current models of crisis communication, and potentially 
expand upon current research on intraorganizational communication in organizational, 
crisis, and business management communication field. 
The study employs a case study approach using a mixed method quantitative and 
qualitative research approach that blends results of focus groups and a written survey. A 
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detailed analysis of the viability of a mixed method research approach is provided in 
Chapter 3. The following research questions provide the basis for the study's direction: 
RQ1 a: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in 
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on length of employment with the 
organization? 
RQlb: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in 
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on employee work location in relation 
to the disaster? 
RQlc: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in 
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on pay type? 
RQ2: To what degree do employees perceive their employing organization to be 
an HRO in the aftermath of a natural disaster-induced crisis? 
RQ3a: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on length of employment with the organization? 
RQ3b: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the disaster? 
RQ3c: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on salaried or hourly employment status? 
The following chapter details the theoretical basis for the research. Chapter 3 
describes the methods by which responses to the questions will be gathered and analyzed. 
Chapter 4 will systematically present the results of this study, and Chapter 5 includes 
discussion of their implications for the field. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This section summarizes the history of crisis communication study within the 
academic realm of organizational communication. In doing so, it explicates several 
major theories of crisis communication in particular. Additionally, this chapter provides 
a summary of what scholars in the study of crisis communication have determined 
regarding organizational communication with employees during and immediately after a 
natural disaster-related crisis occurs. Two theories in particular related to organizational 
crisis communication are identified and explained in terms of natural-disaster crises: 
High Reliability Organization (HRO) practices, and Organizational Learning. HRO and 
Organizational Learning theory both provide a framework from which employer crisis 
communication with employees can be assessed for success and adaptability for other 
organizations. Organizational learning theory provides a basis for determining 
employees' perceptions of a values-based renewal of the organization. Organizational 
learning as a theory is an overarching context in which events in the life of an 
organization can be assessed, analyzed and from which adaptations to operation can be 
based. Organization learning theory is not limited to analysis of crisis events only; t is 
provides a context in which any event can be viewed. It is, however, a particularly useful 
theory to apply to organizations that have experienced crisis, whether man made or not. 
In the situation in which an organization has experienced crisis and remained viable, 
organizational learning theory provides the framework for analysis that instructs what 
that organization is, and what it might become. The High Reliability Organization scale, 
in particular, becomes a means by which organization learning occurs, within the context 
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of internal perception. The HRO provides one set of lens through which analysis of the 
degree of organizational learning can be assessed. An HRO is, by definition, an 
organization that engages in active learning. The link between learning and mindfulness 
in an HRO is a strong and deliberate one. Because by its very nature an HRO engages in 
learning, the HRO scale helps determine to what degree another organization is a learning 
one. Specifically, what is learned about how employee communication was received, 
both literally and perceptually, can be compared using practices of an HRO that have 
articulated into scale form, for the purpose of providing comparison. It provides an 
avenue by which an organization can determine if application of organizational learning 
theory produces anticipated results. 
Organizational communication with employees, both in times of crisis and 
otherwise, occurs in a variety of forms. The nature of the organization typically dictates 
the various channels utilized for communication. Formal internal channels of 
communication may include oral communication such as individual interactions, 
subgroup meetings, or organization-wide settings. Formal internal communication in 
written form often appears in memos, newsletters, emails, and letters. Paralleling formal 
communicative channels are the informal methods of intraorganizational communication. 
Information disseminated orally in social settings, individual discussions, as well as 
informal written channels, can impact organizational actions just as formal methods do. 
Informal channels, in fact, may serve as a more prevalent and powerful means of 
communication than more formal channels can, particularly in moments of crisis. 
Beyond the confines of the organization, communication channels such as media access, 
telephone service, and general public word-of-mouth can potentially impact, both 
positively and negatively, how organizations channel information to employees, and with 
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what degree of success. The nature of a crisis, therefore, often requires that an 
organization utilize communication channels not ordinarily used with employees. The 
need to access formal and informal communication channels, both internally and 
externally to the organization, will likely require flexibility and creativity when 
communicating with employees in times of crisis. 
Crisis Communication Defined 
How can an organization determine when it is in crisis? What does it mean to 
engage in crisis communication as opposed to other forms of intra- and inter-
organizational communication? One of the earliest scholars to combine the concept of 
crisis with communication is C. F. Hermann, who, as a doctoral candidate in 
Northwestern University's political science program, identified the phenomenon of crisis 
in organization with a communicative response (1963). He offered a definition of 
organizational crisis in which an action of some type, either internal or external to the 
organization, threatens the identifying values of the organization, presents a restricted 
amount of time to respond to it, and is unexpected by the organization. This seminal 
definition of an organizational crisis is crucial because it speaks to three key components 
of crisis: threat, restricted response time, and the element of surprise. While subsequent 
research has reshaped this definition to parse out important nuances, these three 
components remain basic to the shared definition of crisis even today. 
The roots of crisis communication within the discipline of speech communication 
are found in the traditions of apologia. Apologia was the earliest form of crisis 
communication. As a distinct rhetorical genre it began with Socrates and the Greek 
culture's belief in the right of a male citizen to address his accusers in defense of self. 
Ware and Linkugel (1973) argued that this public defense evolved over time into a 
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recognizable type of public address, one consisting of predictable phases of accusation 
followed by advocacy of one's reputation. Verbal self-defense within the parameter of 
apologia became the basis of political genre that even recently, scholars recognize as 
classic apologia. Contemporary politicians even today engage in the types of apologia 
that Ware and Linkugel identified: denial, bolstering, differential, and transcendence. 
Denial involves an attempt to simply dissuade one's audience from the belief of 
guilt or responsibility. Often the "sell" of denial hinges upon the concept of intent— 
whether or not an action was taken is not necessarily called into question. What is 
challenged, however, is the motive, if one even existed. Bolstering, on the other hand, is 
the strategy used by the accused to reinforce a perceived positive commonality with one's 
audience, in an attempt to deflect from the action in question. Effective bolstering 
requires the audience to soften its judgment against the accused, based on that feeling of a 
common bond, heritage, or background. Differential apologia employs a subtle but 
distinct difference in approach from bolstering, in that differential apologia, in essence, 
asks the audience to suspend judgment until the action in question can be considered in a 
context. Like bolstering, the accused is not asking his audience to ignore the action, but 
to reconsider in light of a commonality (bolstering) or a particular perspective 
(differentiation). Transcendence, as well, does not ask the audience to ignore what has 
occurred, but to place the event into the context of a larger setting in which the particulars 
of the event lose power. Transcendence as a form of apologia is often used as a means of 
inviting the audience to see the indictment against one's self as an indictment of a larger 
societal idea, norm, or behavior. Hence, the guilt of the accused may be softened in light 
of a perceived attack upon a broader scope, be it a concept or a community. 
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Downey (1993) suggested that a pivotal moment for apologia as a rhetorical 
device occurred in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, with the advent of mass 
media and its influence on American culture, thought, and opinion. This new era created 
a larger stage for individuals to take their case, as it were, to a larger court of public 
opinion. In this process, Downey asserts, apologia further developed into yet a more 
refined form of self-defense. This form which emerged included two key alterations: the 
concept of full disclosure as a means to merely reframe events, and outright avoidance of 
any responsibility for the event in question. The latter strategy, in particular, is 
predicated upon the assumption that "the less said, the better." In other words, minimal 
explanation may lead to minimal discussion. 
Against this background of apologia as a distinct genre within the speech 
communication discipline, the field of communication studies owes a debt to scholars in 
other academic areas for initial research on the concept of crisis communication. Much 
of the literature devoted to this topic is gleaned from research in the disciplines of 
organizational management and public relations. These two disciplines transferred the 
concept of personal accountability, a la apologia, to the realm of organizational 
communication. Only within the past two decades that scholars readily identifiable with 
traditional programs of communication studies have emerged as leaders in the field of 
crisis communication research. 
One finds, for instance, that the "grandfather" of crisis communication as a field 
of study hails from a business management academic background. 1.1. Mitroff first 
began publishing on the concept of effective crisis management in the late 1980s. 
Because of his business management perspective, his research focuses primarily on the 
corporate communicative response to crisis. His definition of a crisis reflects how 25 
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years of corporate development significantly refined Hermann's earlier, more simplistic 
definition. Specifically, Mitroff and his colleagues Shrivastava and Udwadia (1987) 
identified a crisis as disasters that are precipitated by people, organizational structures, 
economics, or technology that cause extensive damage to human life and/or to social 
environments. 
Of note is the significant addition of the elements of technology and of social 
environment. Mitroff and his colleagues are credited with the development of the 
systems approach to crisis management in organizations (Mitroff, Pauchant, & 
Shrivastava, 1998). Crisis researchers perceive this theory as one of the defining ones of 
the field. Mitroff defined the corporate crisis as a normal event within the organization 
which collides with the complexity of the organization and with human error, creating a 
significant threat to the goals of the organization. By normal, Mitroff and his colleagues 
see crisis as an inevitable and often helpful evolution of an organization. While 
unwelcome, an organizational crisis highlights weaknesses of the organization, forces 
error correction and ultimately identifies the group's strengths, both in systemic and 
human resource terms. 
Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998) define organizational crisis as "a specific, 
unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which create 
high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization's high priority 
goals" (p. 233). This definition encompasses the danger to the organization's viability, 
coupled with an extraordinary loss of control. 
As Mitroff was applying a systems approach to crisis communication, Karl E. 
Weick was applying his theory of enacted sensemaking (1988). This approach suggests 
that if an organization is to respond appropriately to crisis and in turn provide appropriate 
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communication around the crisis, the organization must analyze the crisis through a 
sensemaking view. Crises, according to Weick, are defined as events with low probability 
but high consequences that threaten the viability of the organization. This view interprets 
the crisis event from a premise that people enact the environments that constrain them. In 
the context of crisis, this perspective suggests that once the event has occurred, the 
emerging sensemaking that people around the crisis make of it should be the determining 
factor in how the organization shapes its subsequent communication. This theory 
assumes that a systems approach to the crisis would not become evident until those 
affected by the crisis have formed their own context for the crisis. In short, the 
organization cannot anticipate what events will be born, so to speak, as a result of the 
events that people themselves set into motion as a result of the crisis itself. Actions in 
crisis, maintains Weick, are always a little further along than an understanding of the 
crisis. This perspective does not suggest that the organization, then, is impotent to 
respond in times of crisis. Rather, it asserts that the most effective communication will 
be based on response to how those persons involved in the crisis make sense of the crisis' 
influence on them and the organization. 
Theories of Crisis Management 
In the mid-1990s, a new theory of managing crisis through effective 
communication emerged in the form of impression management strategies as defined by 
Allen and Caillouet (1994). Their research marks the emergence of crisis communication 
as a field of specialization in traditional communications academic scholarly journals. 
Impression management strategy posits that corporations, when in crisis, become actors 
that consciously engage in strategic communication that will acknowledge and address 
the complexity of communication required for appropriate response. Crisis within 
17 
organizations requires communication that reinforces the legitimacy of the organization. 
This legitimacy is established through apology, ingratiation, excuses, or justification. 
This theory and these categories build upon the research of Ware and Linkugel (1973) 
which addressed verbal defense in political discourse. Their categories, in turn, emerged 
from Socrates' theory of apologia. Allen and Caillouet have further expanded the verbal 
defense concept to categorize organizational response to crisis. Each of these strategies 
takes one of two forms: an attempt to absolve the actor by the challenger, or an attempt 
to invoke only a mild rebuke and strong forgiveness from the challenger. Apology, 
justification, and excuses fall into the first category and openly admit fault. Allen and 
Caillouet indicate that the most effective form of impression management involves 
ingratiation. They define ingratiation as the attempt to minimize the damage of the crisis 
on the organization by emphasizing the positive qualities, traits, and actions of the 
organization. The organizational actor thereby re-establishes those characteristics their 
constituents perceived as positive about the organization prior to the crisis. Ingratiation 
involves a reframing of the event to emphasize the organization's conformity with normal 
expectations — of behavior or standards - that a first reading of the situation would offer. 
This approach can legitimately be defined as the precursor to the concept of damage 
control or spin control in organizational communication. 
Benoit (1995) established the basis for organizational image restoration discourse 
when he analyzed the restorative strategies of public persons who had suffered some 
form of reputation damage. He worked from the premise that human beings, by nature, 
work hard to reduce or repair real or perceived damage to self-image. Benoit further 
refined apologia by suggesting that not only is it human nature to protect one's public 
image, doing so actually occurs inevitably. This inevitable protection of reputation is 
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based upon four realities. Benoit asserts that modern humans work in a highly 
competitive environment, one that invites constant analysis of usefulness of people, 
products or ideas. Any perceived slight to one's reputation, then, could cause an 
immediate drop in one's public stature. For example, a misstep by a politician can cause 
an immediate drop in public opinion polls. Additionally, events beyond one's control 
often occur that cause a blow to one's reputation. A missed deadline at work may be a 
function of malfunctioning computer systems, but the effect on one's professional 
reputation may be damaging anyway. Further, a negative change in image can occur 
simply because one is human, and humans make mistakes (an alarm clock does not ring 
because it was not set to go off, a meeting is missed, and an image of punctuality is 
damaged). Finally, Benoit suggests that basic human nature pulls us toward image 
restoration because, as individuals in a multicultural, pluralistic society, differences of 
opinion over priorities, values, and goals may hinder reputations. Individuals sharing 
work space may make assumptions about a co-worker's belief system that are based on 
inaccurate information, but the end result is still a diminished reputation. 
Benoit (1995) suggested that to effectively incorporate this theory, one must 
accept two components to a complaint: that the accused is held responsible for the attack, 
fairly or not; and the action which caused the complaint is considered offensive by the 
accuser. Image restoration theory is concerned only with message options to crisis. In 
legitimate ways, Benoit's theory can be perceived as a revision of attribution theory in 
the context of crisis communication as described by Coombs. For example, image 
restoration strategy employs strategies similar to attribution theory: denial, evasion of 
responsibility; reducing offensiveness of the event; corrective action; and mortification. 
One key difference, however, is that image restoration discourse strategy is concerned 
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less with the context in which the crisis occurs than is Coombs' use of attribution theory. 
A detailed explanation of Coombs' attribution theory, and the role of context in his use of 
the theory, is discussed shortly. 
In 1997, Benoit expanded upon the theory of image restoration as a way for 
organizations to approach their response strategies in times of crisis. The basic human 
desire to protect self-image parallels an organization's basic need to create, maintain, 
and, when necessary, restore positive public image. One key difference between 
individual and organizational image restoration, however, is the amount of financial, 
legal, and other types of resources that can typically be invested in the process of 
organizational crisis response. And, though image restoration remains the goal, the 
organization may find that more audiences must be considered in image restoration than 
an individual may face. A corporation, as an example, may have image restoration issues 
in the face of crisis that involve the general public, stockholders, and employees. Image 
restoration may well involve key nuances in message content to each distinct group. 
Another theory emerged in the mid-1990s regarding how an organization should 
communicatively respond to a crisis, this time with distinct emphasis on how the public's 
perception of the organization can be shaped, post-crisis. This emphasis concerns itself 
almost not at all with internal response to the crisis, and expands its concept of response 
past stockholders to include the general public at large. Coombs (1995) proposed a 
theory of crisis response based on attribution theory. Attribution theory asserts people 
feel a need to judge an event in terms of locus, stability, and controllability. Stated 
another way, the public will want to judge or determine if the organization in crisis 
brought it upon itself through an internal weakness, or if an external force was at play. 
Second, attribution theory in crisis management requires that the organization address the 
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stability factor (i.e., if the cause of the crisis is a one-time occurrence or is a constant 
presence). Third, this theory suggests the public will want to know to what degree, if 
any, the organization can control the crisis-inducing event. 
Coombs (1995) expands upon attribution theory in crisis communication to 
suggest five types of crisis response strategies that speak to the three factors of attribution 
theory listed above. Those five types, with accompanying examples, are as follows: 1) 
nonexistence strategies (denial, intimidation); 2) distance strategies (denial of any intent, 
or minimizing damage); 3) ingratiation (praising others, bolstering); 4) mortification 
strategies (repentance); and 5) suffering strategy (seeking sympathy). Coombs defines 
these five types as the most common strategies used by an organization to help the public 
reshape or reframe the crisis, to help the public determine where responsibility lies. 
Further, Coombs suggests the more an organization can reframe for the public so that the 
crisis lies outside its locus of control, the more forgiving the public will be toward an 
organization. Coombs' application of attribution theory to crisis communication requires 
that these five types of strategies be considered within the context of the organization's 
crisis history, the type of crisis at hand, the strength of any evidence about the 
organization's role in the crisis, and how well the organization has performed, overall, in 
the eyes of the public. Each of the five serve at least one of three purposes: to convince 
stakeholders there really is no crisis (denial, for example); to see the crisis as less 
negative than a first assessment would suggest (minimizing damage); or allow the 
stakeholder to see the organization through a more positive lens, with the "help" of the 
crisis (such as the use of ingratiation). 
Early in the 21st century, Seeger (2002) introduced chaos theory as a framework 
for organizational response to crisis. This theory is, without a doubt, one of the more 
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intriguing theories in play in the communication field. It converges the social sciences 
with the so-called "hard" sciences such as physics and mathematics, in that it requires a 
view of organizations as the interplay of dynamic tensions within complex systems 
within a system. Seeger proposes that chaos theory unifies a variety of academic 
disciplines with one meta-theoretical framework for research. One can grasp the viability 
of chaos theory as a communicative approach to crisis within Seeger's assessment that 
this theory seeks to identify predictive understanding of events, but without relying solely 
on causal patterns. Chaos theory suggests the inevitable bifurcation that accompanies 
crisis can allow organizations to evolve into a higher level of order. This presumably 
better level of organizational order births emergent self-organization. In Seeger's view of 
organizational crisis, the participants in the organization engage in a natural process in 
which order re-emerges out of the chaotic state. 
Chaos theory further suggests this self-organization takes place through fractal 
sets, or naturally-occurring self-repeating patterns. The concept of strange attractors 
round out Seeger's definition of chaos theory, and speaks to the way in which typically 
unrelated entities come together, as if by a magnetic force, to create alliances that form 
the basis from which organizations can provide crisis communication. Seeger suggested 
that chaos theory is "tailor made" for communicative response to natural disaster crises. 
Acts-of-God crises such as floods or Hurricanes, he suggested, almost inevitably cause a 
breakdown in communication in organizations due to loss of power, telephones, and 
computers. In the absence of traditional order, persons in organizations will re-organize 
themselves, followed by the next predictable step of formation of alliances (or, in 
Seeger's terms, strange attractors). Faith-based groups with radically different 
philosophies band together to provide aid; governmental organizations work 
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cooperatively with other organizations that typically would be perceived as competitive 
for scarce funding. 
Euphemism as crisis response defines yet another recent crisis management 
strategy that has emerged in the past decade. Stein (1998) offered euphemism as a 
strategy that, while often implemented by organizations in crisis, is not, in his opinion, 
one to be emulated. Euphemism as crisis response refers to the practice of organizations 
to minimize damage and/or responsibility in crises by phrasing response in such a way as 
to appear to be direct in communication when in fact evasiveness is at play. Stein 
described this approach as sinister, in that as the public to which organizations speak we 
find ourselves mesmerized by the play of words that seeks to re-write events. For 
example, making enormous personnel cuts that displace thousands of workers is re-
defined as "RIF," an acronym for Reduction-In-Force that sounds less traumatic than 
"massive loss of jobs." Another example is the use of the phrase "human collateral" in 
reference to numbers of persons killed as a result of war or other combative conflicts. 
Stein suggests the philosophy implicit in euphemistic response to crisis is that some 
thing(s) must die for other(s) to live. The appeal is to a survival-of-the-fittest, with the 
intended audience being safely included in the group of the "fittest." 
Organizational Learning Theory 
Organizational learning theory provides a context in which entities can assess to 
what degree they gain organizational wisdom in the wake of a crisis. Seeger and Ulmer 
(2003) provided a generalized definition of organizational learning stating that it occurs 
when an organization accommodates experience and information. Crisis, they suggest, 
can provide the opportunity for an organization to gain wisdom from the experience of 
the crisis itself, if the organization is so inclined, as well as equipped and able to access 
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such learning. Cohen and Sproull (1996) further defined the parameters of organizational 
learning in the context of three factors: does organizational learning create knowledge 
within the organization that is procedural or declarative; are the results of the learning 
retained in the minds of the individuals who comprise the organization, or in the 
interactions between those individuals; and, does the learning reinforce current practices, 
or does it provoke change? They place no value on either option, but instead suggest 
that true organizational learning occurs when each of these three criteria are met. 
Levitt and March (1996) and March et al. (1991) defined organizational learning 
in the context of different categories than do Cohen and Sproull. They perceive 
organizational learning as routine-based, history-dependent, and target-oriented. 
Organizational learning, within this definition, is confirmed only when historical 
experiences are incorporated into the life of the organization by means of changes in 
practice and procedure. The cognitive, in other words, needs to be manifested in 
behavior. Additionally, the learning is based on the organization's history, its own 
experience of a phenomenon that leads to the behavioral change. Finally, organizational 
learning is target-driven. In this context, the way in which the organization uses acquired 
knowledge ultimately defines knowledge; it is based upon a utilitarian value to the 
organization. 
A particularly attractive feature of organizational learning theory is the 
opportunity it provides for organizations to reframe perceptions of failure. Sitkin (1996) 
suggested failure, as traditionally defined by an organization, is a necessity for effective 
organizational learning. He suggested that learning through failure allows for the idea 
that what was once perceived as failure by an organization, albeit on a small scale, 
actually provides the basis for learning in a positive mode. Small failures provide 
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opportunities for trial runs, if you will, of how the organization might respond if crisis 
arrives in the form of failure on a much larger scale. The absence of organizational 
behavior defined as failures may, in fact, illustrate lack of organizational awareness, and 
hence, less likelihood of the ability to effectively adapt to crisis. 
March, Sproull, and Tamuz (1991) expanded upon what constitutes organizational 
learning pointing out that organizations, in reality, have fairly infrequent opportunities 
from which learning can be gleaned. True opportunities for organizational learning 
present themselves so infrequently that the opportunity for direct experience of the 
"lesson learned," so to speak, will appear less frequently than learning indirectly appears 
(i.e., by watching a competitor deal with a crisis in such a way that learning occurs from 
indirect experience). They eloquently captured the dichotomy of organizational learning 
within the assumption that true opportunities for learning occur infrequently, describing 
organizational learning as" how organizations convert meager experience into 
interpretations of history by experiencing infrequent experiences richly" (p. 2). 
It is March et al.'s (1991) concept of converting meager experiences into an 
opportunity for rich opportunities of organizational learning that most succinctly justifies 
how organizational learning is an "equal opportunity," equally accessible theory of 
organizational learning in times of crisis. This theory can work particularly well for 
those organizations that do not operate in an environment of constant high-risk moments. 
In this way, organizational learning as a theory complements the concept that high 
reliability organizations (HROs) provide a useful basis from which non-HRO 
organizations can assess learning. 
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High Reliability Organizations 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) coined the phrase "High Reliability 
Organization" to reference those organizations that operate on a day-to-day basis in an 
environment where risk and hazard are ever-present and threatening, and yet where the 
organization experiences accidents or incidents at a lower-than-expected level. The High 
Reliability Organization (HRO) is characterized not only by the high risk environment in 
which it operates, but in the manner in which the organization functions day-to-day. The 
successful HRO thrives in a state of constant heightened awareness of failure. Examples 
of organizations that are easily recognizable but perhaps not often considered in terms of 
high reliability include aircraft carriers, air traffic controllers, nuclear power plants, and 
military special operations. HROs share five characteristics that are consistently, 
vigilantly practiced. Successful HROs engage in the following common practices, such 
as: 
• track small failures; 
• resist oversimplification; 
• remain sensitive to operations; 
® maintain capabilities for resilience; 
® take advantage of shifting locations of expertise. 
An examination of each of these five characteristics reveals the nuance behind the 
phrasing Weick and Sutcliffe assigned to effective HROs. Tracking small failures refers 
to the habit of carefully watching for, monitoring, and analyzing small failures. In this 
manner, HROs differ from non-HRO organizations in that small failures are assumed to 
be warning signals of potentially larger problems that can escalate into crisis. HROs 
approach problems or glitches not in terms of "how small" or "how reparable" is this 
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scenario, as much as they approach them in terms of "what larger problem looms beneath 
the surface of this smaller glitch?" Reluctance to simplify speaks to the effective HRO's 
insistence on keeping an alert eye on the larger picture of the organization. While it is 
true that simplification allows an organization to focus on several key issues, use of this 
strategy long term as the predominant management plan reduces the opportunity to keep 
all aspects of the organization at front-and-center. HROs maintain that the tendency to 
simplify, while useful on a short-term basis, misses the early warning signals and other 
methods by which self-assessment and risk assessment can be retrieved. Remaining 
sensitive to operations complements resistance to simplification in that sensitivity to 
operations keeps the components of the well-managed operation constantly in sight. 
Management in HROs appreciates the need not only for sensitivity to the systemic 
operations of the organization, but also to the relationship of those operations to the 
people who actually perform them. A beneficial by-product, then, of ongoing awareness 
of the sensitivity to the human operation of the actual services is an increased likelihood 
that employees will inform management of potential failures before they materialize. 
The fourth common HRO characteristic, commitment to resilience, indicates an inner 
organizational commitment to persevere and remain viable even if inevitable threats to 
the well-being of the organization emerge. Weick and Sutcliff (2001) aptly summed up 
the HRO's commitment to resilience by stating, "The hallmark of an HRO is not that it is 
effort-free but that errors don't disable it" (p. 14). The fifth HRO characteristic, 
deference to expertise, speaks to the respect for, and inclusion of, input from 
organizational members at all levels of the operation. An effective HRO has less interest 
in a rigid reporting structure than in an environment which invites, encourages, and 
rewards input from members. These members, through daily routine and practice of their 
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crafts, are perceived as experts as a result of their training or experiences. Venette (2003) 
pointed out individuals closest to an identified problem will typically possess information 
as useful to decision-making as any other source of input, sometimes more so. In fact, 
when that inherent input based on experience is ignored, employees may tend to perceive 
themselves as less knowledgeable, and expect management to provide knowledge at a 
level that it may, in fact, not possess. Further, an organization that leaves employees out 
of the equation when seeking high reliability mindfulness runs the risk of creating just the 
opposite effect of benign mindlessness among employees (Novak, 2006). Employees 
who do not expect the opportunity to give input will, over time, potentially slip into a 
routine of inattention to risk-reducing detail. 
If HROs operate in a constant state of high intensity, high-risk environments with 
"exciting" settings such as combat zones and aircraft carriers, of what could more 
"mundane" organizations such as law firms and lumber companies take note? They 
should take note because, in all organizations, in one form or another, crisis will occur. 
The value of HROs to lower-risk, lower-intensity organizational settings is that the habits 
honed by HROs serve as real-life, real-time examples of crisis planning, implementation, 
and practice. Any organization is one crisis away from destruction. One foreign object 
found in a food product, one poorly executed maintenance routine, one ignored safety 
check, one act of sexual misconduct, or one category five Hurricane can cause enormous 
harm - including destruction - of an organization. 
It is important to note, however, that proponents of the HRO concept do not assert 
that an organization must obtain and nurture all five characteristics of an HRO as listed 
above. While the very nature of environmentally intense HROs require the presence of 
these shared attributes, less risk-prone organizations have the flexibility to observe, learn, 
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and adapt those practices that make the most sense for them. Indeed, Vogus and 
Welbourne (2003) suggested those organizations not typically needing to operate in total 
"HRO mode" will gain the most use from adoption of the concept of "mindfulness" in the 
effective HRO. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) defined mindfulness as "a rich awareness of 
discriminatory detail" (p. 32). Vogus and Welbourne maintained that mindfulness aptly 
combines the five characteristics into an easier-to-access concept for lower-risk 
organizations to implement. Practice of mindfulness allows the organization to keep the 
big picture in mind - including deference to expertise and understanding of operations -
while attending to the smaller detail that may reveal a risk-laden scenario. 
Vogus and Welbourne (2003) linked Weick and Sutcliffe's (2007) concept of 
mindfulness to Perrow's (1994) concept of tight coupling, speaking to the way that non-
HROs may best gain useful practice from the study of HROs. The degree to which an 
organization is perceived as an HRO depends in some part upon the measure of loose and 
tight coupling in the organizational structure, a concept introduced by Perrow (1994). 
Perrow described organizations that engage in tight coupling as those that have no buffer 
between phases of operation, output, or process (p. 90). The organization's flow of 
business service or product creation is so intricately interwoven that the slightest 
variation of routine of one step immediately and potentially adversely affects the ensuing 
steps. Tight coupling can be found in highly structured linear organizations such as 
factories, as well as in highly structured complex organizations, such as a nuclear power 
plant. 
Conversely, Perrow (1994) describes loosely coupled organizations as those 
enjoying a higher level of intra-organizational flexibility among functions, departments 
or steps in a process (p. 91). A departure from normal operating procedure in one area of 
29 
a loosely coupled organization will not necessarily cripple another area. The impact of 
such a departure may result in an impact on the rest of the organization along a 
continuum of no impact at all to direct impact. Loosely coupled organizations tend to be 
characterized by highly organized, multi-level areas of operation. A university serves as 
a good example of an organization that typically engages in loose coupling (p. 97). An 
interruption of the teaching process in the biology department with the unexpected 
absence of an instructor will significantly, directly, and immediately impact that 
department, with no - or scant - impact on, for example, the history department. 
However, the loss of electricity in the physical plant will likely create a significant, 
direct, and immediately felt impact on most, if not all, areas of the university. 
It would be inaccurate to infer that, overall, loose coupling in organizations 
creates an inherent advantage over tight coupling. The nature of the organization, as well 
as its product or service, impacts the efficacy of loose or tight coupling. For example, 
Perrow (1994) pointed out that tight coupling allows for a more time-dependent response 
to crisis than does loose coupling. However, the degree to which the organization has 
prepared for, and engaged in, appropriate crisis management response impacts the degree 
to which crisis creates failure in organizations that engage in tight coupling, not the tight 
coupling itself. On the other hand, Seeger (2002) maintained that organizations engaging 
in tight coupling do tend to experience accidents more often than loosely coupled 
organizations (p. 13). They theorize that the inflexibility of tightly coupled organizations 
inherently limits the options for effective crisis response. Conversely, then, they assert 
that loosely coupled organizations enjoy a level of ambiguity and flexibility that allows 
for creative response to crisis, which in turn increases the chances of averting failure. 
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The HRO organization, provides a framework in which the theory of 
organizational learning can be placed. In this fashion, an organization, post-crisis, can 
assess to what degree the infrequent experience of a crisis provided opportunities for 
learning. Further, the HRO model can provide the foundation from which to assess 
learning. Organizational learning theory within a context of HROs provides the 
framework and the checklist by which an organization can assess what has been gained 
from the incident of crisis. The organization that experiences a natural disaster-related 
crisis is, arguably, the most likely candidate for the effective blending of organizational 
learning within the tenets of HROs. Natural disaster-related crises are fairly infrequent 
for the average organization, if "infrequent" can be assumed to mean an occurrence of 
less than once per year. 
Organizational Crisis Communication with Employees 
What does the literature say about effective communication with employees 
during and after organizational crisis? Surprisingly little. A review of more than 20 
scholarly articles pertaining to organizational communication and crisis revealed only 
seven articles that addressed, either directly or indirectly, the role of internal 
communication for an organization in crisis. What can be gleaned from the literature 
regarding if, when, and how to communicate with employees during organizational crisis 
is reviewed here. 
Billings, Milburn and Schallman (1980) explored the element of surprise that is 
part-and-parcel of crisis, and the high level of emotional response that crisis situations 
tend to evoke in employees. They discussed the concept of emotional inoculation, a 
coping mechanism that is triggered by an organizational event that meets the definition of 
a crisis and for which there was no warning. A "shorthand" definition of emotional 
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inoculations refers to the high level of stress and anxiety which an unanticipated event in 
the life of an organization creates in an employee, in the absence of any information that 
may have been present prior to the event. In other words, when the employee has access 
to information about potential crises, whether of high or low probability, he is caught off 
guard and experiences a sense of loss, threat, and anxiety in the face of an organizational 
event. Billings et al. suggested in their research, published fairly early in the history of 
crisis communication research, that planning and anticipation of possible crisis events on 
the part of organizations can help lessen the probability of anxiety and stress on the part 
of employees when crises inevitably occur. 
Mitroff et al. (1987) acknowledged the importance of providing coping 
mechanisms to employees as commentary on their systems approach to crisis 
management. They describe the coping phase in terms of drawing a close, tight net 
around the crisis event, and in the process, implementing pre-determined crisis 
management teams. These teams, Mitroff suggested, should focus on emotional 
responses of employees within organizations in crisis. He reminds organizations that 
predictable human emotional response to crisis such as denial, depression, and anger are 
often difficult to manage, especially in the absence of planning for crisis. 
Pearson and Mitroff (1993) also urged organizational review of crisis 
management response to determine to what degree, if any, employees' feedback has been 
sought regarding needs and skills in relation to whatever equipment or technology is 
involved in performing one's job functions. These kinds of considerations, they 
maintained, become of paramount importance when crisis occurs. Lack of regard for the 
opinion and advice of employees who are "hands on" with organizational materials, tools, 
and equipment can create significant increase in employee stress during periods of crisis. 
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If such considerations have not been taken into account, an employee's sense of personal 
accountability in a crisis is usually heightened. Subsequently, then, organizations also, 
Pearson advised, engage in "no fault learning," which is to say, avoidance of placing 
blame for the crisis on an individual employee, except in scenarios of deliberate bad faith 
action. 
Weick's (1988) sense making model of crisis management is based in large part 
on the role of employees in the enactive perspective. In fact, the human response to crisis 
is the absolute basis of Weick's enactment perspective. New realities are put into motion 
only in the enactment phase of response to crisis. He further suggests the concept of 
"tenacious justification" on the part of the organization can be beneficial to employees, in 
that it can help generate meaning and order in the face of confusion, fear, and ambiguity. 
It can also provide a much-needed sense of order for the organization's personnel. Weick 
also pointed out the importance of sense-making for employees in a crisis-ridden 
organization in terms of developing a sense of capacity. If, after initial surprise has 
subsided, the organization can assist the employee in seeing how he has the capacity to 
assist in the face of the crisis, that sense of capacity can create difference. Stated another 
way, Weick suggested that a sense of capacity begets a sense of making a difference, 
which begets the much-needed sense of control which had been lost in the aftermath of 
the crisis. 
In November 2001, after the horror of the September 11 attacks, Kiger (2001) 
presented research addressing the information gap regarding effective organizational 
communication with employees during and immediately after times of crisis. Key issues 
covered in his research included the need to communicate immediately with all 
employees, whether local or based halfway around the world. Further, traditional 
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avenues of instant communication such as e-mail, text messaging, and telephoning may 
not be functional. Kiger recommends a crisis response plan that includes continually 
updated contact names and telephone numbers of all employees, so that as soon as 
communicative tools are re-established, personal contact can be immediately 
implemented. Once that contact is initiated, Kiger maintained the communicative needs 
of the employee are quite often very similar to the communicative needs of other 
stakeholders. All constituent groups, employees in particular, want to know the status of 
co-workers, the status of their employment and benefits, and how they can help. 
Employees cannot hear too often that the organization will survive, that the chief 
operating officer is highly visible and in control, and that a planned response is already in 
operation. In short, employees need basic assurances that all will be well right now, next 
week, and beyond. 
Seeger and Ulmer (2002) provided one of the more fascinating analyses of 
organizational crisis communication in which attention to employees in the organization 
intentionally drives the response to the crisis. Seeger and Ulmer, in an effort to provide 
an alternative to a defensive response to crisis, researched the responses in which two 
organizations made care for, and attention to, employees the basis on which all crisis 
response was predicated. Seeger and Ulmer cited Maiden Mills and Cole Hardwoods as 
examples of organizations whose management chose to frame post-crisis discourse 
solidly in terms of potentially positive outcomes of negative events. In doing so, the 
owners of these two companies exhibited an astonishing degree of commitment to their 
employee groups as the basis on which new and innovative directions their businesses 
would take. 
34 
Both Maiden Mills and Cole Hardwoods are independently-owned businesses that 
were destroyed by fires; Maiden Mills in 1995 and Cole Hardwoods in 1998. Owners 
Feuerstein and Cole, respective owners of these business enterprises, each determined his 
business would re-build, would remain viable with competitors, and would do so by 
demonstrating, both verbally and in deed, a commitment to the employees and to the 
community in which the business was located. Both made immediate statements to the 
local community and communicated to all employees that the business would re-build, 
would remain in the local community, and that all employees would remain on payroll, 
with no interruption in benefits. The actions were perceived in the larger business world 
as an extraordinary business strategy gesture and action. 
Seeger and Ulmer (2002) suggested that these actions demonstrated brilliant 
response to crisis, not just in terms of the evident care and commitment the owners 
demonstrated toward their employees. They suggest in the act of putting employee 
welfare first, the owners accomplished two goals simultaneously. First, they clearly 
demonstrated that employees are stakeholders in the business, thus widening the 
understanding and scope of what it means to speak immediately to one's stakeholders, 
post-crisis. Additionally, they took the emphasis off the typical negative reaction to a 
crisis - in each case, a devastating fire - and placed the emphasis squarely in terms of a 
positive, humanitarian, and innovative entrepreneurial event. 
Further, Seeger and Ulmer (2002, 2003) proposed that these acts speak to the 
moral imperative of organizations to respond in an ethical manner to their employees 
during times of crisis. They described the imperative as post-crisis organizational virtue, 
in which the values of the organization's sense of social responsibility are either revealed 
or reinforced. The social responsibility of reaching out to one's workforce is measured 
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by a variety of standards, including types of outreach offered, immediacy of 
communication, quality of communication and reassurance - when it can be given - that 
the organization still has a future that includes the workforce. Seeger and Ulmer (2003) 
expanded upon the concept of virtuous organizational leadership by offering three kinds 
of communication-based responsibilities in which organizational leaders should engage 
in times of crisis. They include: a) communicating values that create a moral climate; b) 
communicating in a way that invites thorough knowledge of organizational operations; 
and c) maintaining openness to signs of problems. The third "must have" form of 
communication is consistent with Weick and Sutcliffe's (2001, 2007) earlier delineated 
theory of HROs. As well, it emphasizes a contemporary societal expectation of social 
responsibility, a la creation of a moral climate, which may likely extend to social 
responsibility in the face of natural disaster-related crisis. 
Events within the past seven years in American history have emphasized the 
imperative Seeger and Ulmer (2003) suggested that a moral imperative exists for 
organizations to respond to their employee stakeholders with the same level of care and 
investment as they do for their public stakeholders such as stockholders, customers, or 
clients, and the general public or community where it is located. Recent national events 
have painfully illustrated that in times of crisis, the federal government's level of 
response has created a lowered level of expectation among Americans. A new reality has 
emerged, and that reality can best be described as an acknowledgment of its citizenry that 
the United States government cannot be counted on to fully anticipate, provide for, and 
protect its citizens in crisis incidents of a national scale. The terrorist bombings of the 
United States Pentagon and the New York World Trade Center towers in September of 
2001 were followed in fairly short order by the destruction wreaked on the southeastern 
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United States by Hurricane Katrina. Both of these national crises illustrated all too 
painfully the inability of the federal government to intervene in effective ways. Benson 
(2006) noted that some government officials themselves, in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, articulated the shortcomings of the federal government regarding adequate 
response. These officials urged local communities to acknowledge and address the need, 
therefore, for communities to prepare themselves accordingly. 
Heath (1997) stated that during times of crisis, audiences are more attentive to 
messages from the organization. Heath also proposed that this heightened attentiveness 
provides an opportunity for the organization to demonstrate a commitment to effective 
communication, and a commitment to taking responsible action. With an organization's 
employees defining one type of audience to which that organization should attend, the 
opportunity for enacting demonstrable commitment becomes crucial to surviving crisis. 
The results of research by Sanchez et al as early as 1995 spoke to the need for 
business organizations to engage in proactive response to employees in the wake of a 
natural disaster. Like research previously cited, their analysis of the ways in which 
corporations responded to Florida-based employees in the wake of Hurricane Andrew 
confirmed that responding as a responsible employer parallels response as a responsible 
member of the larger community. Employees in the aftermath of a natural disaster are 
consumed with meeting basic needs: where will I live, what and how will I eat, how will 
I survive? 
Harvey and Haines (2005) concluded that companies that participate in the 
recovery of the communities in which their employees live are likely to reap intangible 
benefits. They determined that how the management of a company interacts in the 
recovery process is just as important as what they do. An employee is likely to attach a 
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positive emotional response to an employer's involvement in their and their 
communities', recoveries. In short, the why, the how, and the what of the organizational 
interaction with the recovering community are often positively significant to the 
employee. 
Maslow's Needs Hierarchy 
Maslow described a hierarchy of needs that humans seek to meet in an effort to 
reach full human potential (1954). Maslow described this potential as self-actualization. 
Self-actualization is based upon stages of physiological, emotional, and psychological 
needs that must be met, and in a certain order, for human self-fulfillment to be achieved. 
A broadly generalized explanation of the hierarchy of needs suggests the basic 
physiological needs must be met before the luxury, so to speak, of emotional and 
psychological needs can be addressed. An understanding of both Maslow's definition 
and description of basic physiological needs provides a context in which to assess 
effectiveness of crisis communication. 
Maslow (1954) stated all humans are motivated by needs specific to us as 
humans: the need for food, safety, protection, and care. It is upon these basic survival 
needs that other needs are formed and ultimately met. When these basic needs are not 
met, the acquisition of them becomes of primary, overriding importance. All other needs 
are pushed aside; psychological and emotional needs become irrelevant in the face of 
unanswered basic survival needs. Further, Maslow asserted, a person's vision of what his 
future entails changes dramatically in the threat of loss of basic survival needs. Social, 
professional, and emotional aspirations become virtually irrelevant when humans are 
deprived of safety, food, shelter, and care. Maslow suggested there is, even within the 
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context of physiological needs, yet another level that he describes as the safety needs: 
security, stability, protection, and ultimately, freedom from chaos and/or anxiety. 
The degree to which employers can assist their workforce in addressing those 
basic survival concerns will impact the degree to which the communities in which they 
live regain normalcy as well. Stated very explicitly, organizations exist in communities 
comprised of humans who, in times of crisis, experience an overwhelming need to have 
basic survival needs met. Maslow (1954) suggested that any act that helps humans regain 
equilibrium, after temporary loss of basic human survival needs, will be perceived as a 
beneficial psychological gain. Thus, the organization that takes definitive steps to assist 
employees in regaining psychological equilibrium through a reordering of food, safety, 
and shelter exercises both good citizenship and good employee relations. What benefits 
the employee benefits the community in which he lives. In times of crisis, this concept 
moves beyond a "good will building" public relations concept into a literal life-or-death 
reality. 
Similarly, Schouten et al. (2004) saw the role of business organizations as integral 
members of their communities. According to Schouten et al, when high levels of 
commitment to the work force are communicated by the employer to the employee, the 
organization becomes a stabilizing force both in the lives of employees and in the larger 
community. The workplace typically serves a significant organizing force in the lives of 
adults. Not only does one's employment provide wages, it provides other tangibles such 
as medical insurance and retirement pensions. Equally important, the workplace provides 
intangibles such as structure, stability, and opportunities for interpersonal relationships 
and support. Therefore, Schouten and colleagues contended, the stability employers offer 
to employees, particularly in the wake of a disaster, ultimately also serves as a stabilizing 
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force for the larger community in which the organization is placed. This assessment 
parallels research by Seeger and Ulmer (2002) regarding the societal and ethical role of 
the organization in times of crisis. Hoffman's (2006) research found the level of social 
support one finds in place in the aftermath of a natural disaster - specifically, a flood — 
correlates with positive psychological outcomes measured in those persons who 
experienced the disaster firsthand. The emotional support that often is intertwined with 
the social support found in the work place can greatly aid the disaster victim in his return 
to a sense of stability and normalcy. 
Impact of Employee Characteristics 
An analysis of organizational crisis communication provides an opportunity to 
discern to what degree, if any, varying factors among a common group impact the way in 
which communication is both received and perceived. Employees, for example, share the 
commonality of the same employer. However, variances exist within that employment 
status; employees differ in a variety of ways, including age, sex, race, number of years of 
employment and for some organizations, work site location. Allen (1995) addressed the 
variant of race in an organization to emphasize the need for organizations to be cognizant 
of, and build upon, differences that can enrich an organization, if those differences are 
viewed as enriching the organization instead of limiting it. 
Rosenfeld, Richman and May (2004) analyzed the impact of information 
adequacy to job satisfaction as it relates to work location. Their research determined that 
both levels of job satisfaction and satisfaction with information adequacy are, in fact, 
impacted by one's work location. Two types of employees, those in the office and those 
"in the field," were surveyed regarding information adequacy, and differences were, in 
fact, confirmed. This study confirmed the importance of organizational communication 
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analysis within the context of employee differences imposed by the organization itself. 
In this case, the imposed factor is location. 
On the other hand, Cheney, Zorn, Planalp and Lair (2008) speak to the need for 
organizational communication scholars to more fully explore and define the impact of 
variances within a work force over which the organization has no impact. They urge 
further research regarding to what degree meaningful work for employees is impacted by 
multiple differences, such as ethnicity, nationality, gender and class. The rapidly 
changing global nature of businesses, and thus work forces, requires organizations to 
continually assess variances in work force demographics that may require adjustments in 
communication strategies. Information adequacy perceptions by employees ultimately 
will be impacted by variables both inside and outside the scope of the organization. The 
organization may determine from what location, for example, an employee works -
telecommuting, local office, "in the field," etc. - but cannot fully control the variables 
that further inform employee satisfaction with communication: age, sex, race, or even 
religious beliefs. Effective communication strategies, therefore, require careful 
consideration of all factors impacting how an employee will perceive information. 
Each organization's unique qualities determine what characteristics may impact 
organizational crisis communication. For example, organizational cultural issues may be 
impacted by for-profit or non-profit status, the kind of educational qualifications required 
for employment, or the degree to which the organization is diversified by geographical 
locations, including cyberspace-based work sites. An effective organizational study will 
require an understanding of the individual characteristics, and their nuances, that 
comprise an organization. 
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For this particular case study, analysis focused on three characteristics of the 
employment pool at the time of the crisis that may have impacted perceptions. Those 
three variables include number of years of employment with the organization, work site 
location in relation to the disaster and pay type. Given the non-profit nature of the 
organization analyzed, as well as the primacy of an educational mission for the 
university, these characteristics provided a basis for meaningful comparison. 
Within an organization, differences of employee perceptions may exist based on 
length of employment. For an institution of higher learning, length of employment is 
often a resulting function of two of the three variables highlighted in this study: 
employment length and pay type. An inherent stratification among university employees 
exists by the mere nature of the organization, based on the fact that tenured professors 
tend to stay at one institution throughout the length of their careers - thus creating along 
term employment relationship with one organization - and they are typically paid on a 
salaried basis. On the other hand, the majority of non-teaching employees who support 
the educational mission of a university may experience greater turnover of personnel, 
absent the job insurance of tenure. Further, the majority of these non-teaching employees 
are often paid on an hourly basis instead of salaried. 
Additionally, institutions of higher learning are frequently multi-site 
organizations. These multi-site organizations usually identify a "home" campus at which 
the higher level administration is housed, and which becomes the landmark campus of 
reference for the university. Satellite campus-based employees may possess varying 
views of the organization based on physical distance from that main campus, which in 
turn could hold implications for effective organizational communication practices. 
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Summary 
This study will examine the degree to which one organization, in the aftermath of 
a natural disaster crisis, enacted organizational learning. It will also determine to what 
degree attributes of High Reliability Organizations were used, and with what degree of 
success, based on feedback from employees. The concept of organizational learning and 
the degree to which it is manifested utilizing a High Reliability Organization perception 
scale yielded the following research questions: 
RQla: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in 
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on length of employment with the 
organization? RQlb: How do employees characterize their organization's 
communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on employee work 
location in relation to the disaster? RQlc: How do employees characterize their 
organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on 
pay type? This data will provide information about internal crisis communication with a 
group of stakeholders seldom studied in the literature; namely, how employees perceive 
employer's efforts to communicate with them. The data will allow the opportunity for 
response of employees to the organization. In doing so, strategies for improving upon 
internal crisis communication efforts can be assessed and, if appropriate, improved. 
RQ2: To what degree do employees characterize their organization as an HRO in 
the aftermath of a natural-disaster induced crisis? Information regarding whether or not 
an organization is perceived by employees as having utilized HRO characteristics in 
response to a natural disaster crisis will greatly broaden existing uses of the HRO scale. 
Amending the HRO characteristics in a survey form in order to describe an organization 
that typically does not operate in a high risk environment will test the feasibility of 
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applying the HRO scale to less high-risk organizations. In doing so, an organization has 
the potential to ascertain if organizational learning has occurred, from the employee 
perspective of risk management. 
RQ3a: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on length of employment with the organization? Such 
data will provide insight into the degree to which a longer term employee/employer 
relationship affects an employee's perception of the organization. Ascertaining if 
perceptions vary based upon employee length of service informed to what degree, if any, 
an organization may need to adjust operations. This information will be especially 
helpful to organizations that value positive employee perceptions of high reliability. 
RQ3b: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the disaster? 
To what degree the geographical location of the workplace impacts an employee's 
perception of organizational reliability may prove particularly insightful when a multi-
site organization assesses communication efficacy in times of natural disaster crises. 
What proves to be effective at one location may or may not show statistical significance 
in comparison with other sites. Similarly, data may reveal there is no significant 
difference based on geographical location, and therefore crisis communication strategies 
do not need to be location-sensitive. Such information may potentially provide an 
organization with the impetus to adjust risk management procedures - and dissemination 
of such - based upon the needs of various work sites. 
RQ3c: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on salaried or hourly employment status? The federal 
government distinguishes, for purposes of fair labor standards, between employees who 
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are paid an hourly wage and those employees who are salaried. Hourly wage employees 
are eligible for overtime pay from an employer, unlike the salaried employee who is paid 
a flat wage, no matter what amount of time is required to accomplish a task or project. 
Subsequently, the quality of relationship between an employer and these two types of 
employees may differ in intangible ways. An employer, then, may find that the type, 
scope, and frequency of communication with an employee in times of natural disaster 
crisis vary based on the way in which the employee is compensated. Such a finding may 
potentially provide a rationale for further assessment and possible adjustment of 
employee relations strategies, based on compensation status. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the procedures used to collect and analyze data for the 
purpose of addressing the research questions listed below. It provides rationale for the 
research procedures selected; information regarding the organization surveyed; how the 
procedures were implemented with the sample population; and how the data was 
analyzed. 
Mixed Method Approach 
This research employed a mixed method research design in case study form, 
analyzing an educational organization; specifically, a dual campus, mid sized public 
university located in the southeast. Detailed explanation of this approach follows. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) defined mixed methodology as the use of both the 
quantitative and qualitative research paradigms within the same study. The use of mixed 
methodology research has caused much debate in recent decades regarding its appropriate 
place in social sciences research. However, contemporary research scholars endorse the 
concept that a blending of the two methodologies, in certain research arenas, is both 
appropriate and even necessary to obtain the most vigorous assessment of the research 
question. 
Morse (2003) succinctly provided a cogent rationale for the implementation of 
mixed method design in reminders that the ultimate goal of social science research is to 
obtain the most complete picture possible of human behavior and experience. There are 
times, then, when implementation of both quantitative and qualitative research design in a 
study will help us reach more quickly the understanding we seek in our research 
endeavors. Mixed method research design can prove to be especially powerful when 
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analyzing extraordinary events, such as a natural disaster, when the combination of self-
reported survey responses about the event is incomplete without grasping the details and 
stories about self-reported responses to the experience. In short, the "what" question of 
the experience of the event necessitates asking the "why" and the "how" in a way that 
quantitative research design cannot readily capture. Conversely, the "why" and the 
"how" cannot be ascertained until the "what" is defined by the quantitative research 
design. A key component of the success of mixed method research design, according to 
Morse (2003), is the need for a clearly defined dominant method in the research design, 
with additional methodologies supplementing the goals of the dominant method. 
Contemporary communication scholars have utilized a mixed method research 
design approach with success. Venette (2003), for example, used a mixed methodology 
with a quantitative survey followed by oral interviews to determine risk communication 
perceptions of employees in a high reliability organization. Venette, Lang, and Coyle 
(2003) employed a combination of an electronic survey with focus group discussions to 
study risk communication as argument, analyzing student perceptions of responsible 
drinking. 
The current study utilized a quantitative research design as the primary form of 
data collection, using qualitative methodology to enhance understanding of the data that 
were collected quantitatively. For this study's research purposes, qualitative data was 
gathered via both individual and focus group interviews. Based upon feedback gleaned 
from those two sources, a written survey was administered to provide quantitative data. 
This study addressed the following research questions: 
RQla, RQlb, andRQlc: RQ1 a: How do employees characterize their 
organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on 
47 
length of employment with the organization?; RQlb: How do employees characterize 
their organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis 
based on employee work location in relation to the disaster?; and RQlc: How do 
employees characterize their organization's communication in response to a natural-
disaster induced crisis based on pay type? This question assessed in what ways 
employees responded to an organization's communication in response to Katrina, in 
general terms that allow clarity about overall level of satisfaction, regardless of how those 
responses correlate to characteristics of a high reliability organization. The primary 
source of data for these three RQ's was qualitative data gathered in focus group meetings 
and in open-ended questions in the written survey. The data was then reflected in the 
wording of the written survey, providing a quantitative measure for the RQ's. These 
RQ's were addressed in writing both by closed and by open ended questions on the 
survey. One-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, as was frequency distribution using 
chi-squared analysis. 
RQ2: To what degree do employees characterize their organization as an HRO in 
the aftermath of a natural-disaster induced crisis? This question employed the 
characteristics of a high reliability organization in survey form (in both hard copy and 
online options) to determine to what degree, if any, employees perceived the organization 
as an HRO, and further, to provide data regarding why the organization was or was not 
perceived as such around the event of Hurricane Katrina. The primary source of data for 
this RQ was a quantitative, in the form of a written survey. 
RQ3a: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on length of employment with the organization? This 
RQ assessed the degree to which employment longevity correlates with perception of 
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organizational reliability based on communication during natural disasters. RQ3a was 
also explored with a quantitative method through a written survey. 
RQ3b: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, following a 
natural disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the 
disaster? Data related to this RQ was gathered through the quantitative tool of written 
survey and with qualitative data gathered via focus group interviews. 
RQ3c: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability vary based on 
salaried or hourly employment status? RQ3 was addressed in a quantitative survey 
method, with a comparison and regression analysis between self-reported pay status and 
responses to those survey questions that relate to HRO characteristics. 
Case Study Approach 
Yin (2003) aptly stated the rationale for the decision to use a case study approach 
for analyzing the research questions presented in this study: "In general, case studies are 
the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context" (p. 1). Certainly, the event that was 
Hurricane Katrina fell outside the control of the employees of the organization that was 
studied. Equally, the investigator's ability to control what, how, and why communication 
with their employer affected these employees was also outside the realm of their control. 
The focus of the study — assessing crisis communication efficacy within the organization 
- remained contemporary. Though the initial event of Hurricane Katrina occurred more 
than three years ago, the assessment of the crisis communication actions taken remains 
relevant, so that "lessons learned" can be fully ascertained for use in the event of another 
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Hurricane or other form of natural disaster. And, it cannot be denied, surviving a 
category five hurricane is about as "real life" a context as one can find. 
The case study, as Sypher (1997) saw it, allows the communication scholar to 
appropriately blend theory with practice. Sypher spoke of the flexibility the case study 
approach offers, particularly in its epistemic role. Sypher maintained case studies 
provide multiple ways by which scholars can acquire useful data, applying four basic 
categories based on case study focus: epistemic, rhetorical, skill enhancement, and 
narrative. The epistemic approach suggests case studies provide a new way of knowing. 
The rhetorical approach of a case study assumes an argument is inherent in the study; that 
some form of evidence will emerge that informs a particular point of view. The skill-
enhancement approach speaks to the assumption we learn from observing. Therefore, the 
investigator as communicator learns simply by observing, independently of whatever else 
may emerge from the data. Finally, the narrative approach to case studies suggests the 
value of the story rests, first and foremost, in the power of the story that emerges. 
This case study approach is successfully utilized across all social science 
disciplines. Recent examples include Miles' (2007) use of the case study method to 
analyze one immigrant's experience in the United States as he negotiated a new cultural 
environment, particularly in his place of employment. Grantham (2007) also adopted a 
case study method to assess communication strategies employed in a recent corporate 
takeover of one multinational company by another one. 
This current study consisted of three key components. One involved individual 
interviews with persons in the organization who implemented employee communication 
before and after Katrina. These interviews helped ascertain what written and/or ad hoc 
communication plan was implemented; individual perceptions of the efficacy of those 
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plans; and reflections about the personal impact of attempting to initiate employee 
communication from a professional sense of responsibility. The three focus groups 
allowed for a "test drive" of the written survey's first draft. The feedback received from 
this group proved invaluable in terms of understandability, readability and scope. 
Equally important, the focus groups allowed for the chance to learn what key topics 
relative to communication had not been included in the initial survey draft. Having input 
from employees at various work sites tremendously increased the richness of the survey, 
since it provided perspectives from multiple viewpoints, other than basic geographical 
differences. The final component of the case study involved the distribution of a written 
survey which combined both quantitative and qualitative questions. 
Qualitative Research Design: Interviews 
Qualitative data was obtained in two ways: individual interviews with persons 
within the organization who played a vital role in the organization's crisis communication 
during and after Katrina, and focus group interviews with employees who were on 
payroll during Katrina. Five employees were interviewed in one-on-one meetings during 
which the investigator took written notes, recording the impressions and recollections of 
the interviewee's role in communicating with employees during the time period 
surrounding the Hurricane. Those interviewed included the university's human resources 
director; two public relations administrators at the gulf coast campus; a public relations 
administrator for the Hattiesburg campus; and the director of the Hattiesburg campus 
physical plant. Through a series of questions that focused on the communicative process 
right before and right after Katrina, the following themes emerged regarding 
organizational communication decision-making and subsequent action: 
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• lack of a viable frame of reference regarding how to prepare, given the 
enormity of the category 5 hurricane; 
® lack of a viable frame of reference regarding how to respond, given the 
enormity of the category 5 hurricane; 
• sense of helplessness to accurately warn and inform employees, once the 
severity of the storm became evident; 
o sense of helplessness to respond and communicate, in the days immediately 
after Katrina hit, due to unprecedented loss of normal communicative 
channels; 
• sense of guilt for being unable to "do more." 
Information gathered from theses interviews, combined with the basic question which 
comprised the HRO perception scale, formed the basis of the written survey that was 
distributed to employee focus groups. 
The focus groups were identified from the list of employees who were on payroll 
during Katrina, with a goal of providing the greatest balance of support staff, 
administrators and faculty. 
Additionally, campus location was a factor in the creation of the list of employees 
invited to participate, as was gender and ethnicity. To that end, three focus groups were 
formed: one from the Hattiesburg campus, one from the Gulf Park/Long Beach campus, 
and one at the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory. A total of 33 employees participated. 
Each participant was assured anonymity, both in the written invitation to participate, as 
well as verbally before the focus group discussion began. Sessions lasted approximately 
one hour, with two of the sessions being held over the lunch hour and one being held mid 
afternoon. Participants had received a draft of the survey approximately one week prior 
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to the focus group meeting. They were asked to bring the survey to the meeting, and to 
be prepared to offer verbal and/or written suggestions. A scribe was present at two of the 
three sessions. 
Common suggestions, themes and concerns that emerged from the focus groups 
included the following: 
® confusion about whether the respondent should think of the organization in 
terms of the entire institution or in terms of geographic work location; 
® expansion of the list of ways in which information was received, both before 
and after Katrina; 
9 a desire to have ample opportunity, via open ended questions on the survey, to 
provide feedback about individual perceptions of the university's 
communication with employees during the crisis; 
• clarification of time frames when responding to "before" and "after" questions 
- i.e., how many days, weeks, etc constituted those concepts. 
Additionally, participants in each focus group took the opportunity to discuss 
personal experiences and impressions regarding the university in the aftermath of 
Katrina, whether or not related to the topics addressed on the survey. The need to keep 
the focus group on task was a challenging one. However, the discussion did illustrate the 
potential for the HRO perception portion of the survey to capture opinions about non-
communication related topics that emerged in the focus groups. Issues of the role of 
individual employee input in decision-making and perceptions of the university's interest 
in being prepared for crisis, for example, were part-and-parcel of the HRO component of 
the survey. 
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Quantitative Research Design: Survey 
The primary quantitative research design form consisted of a written survey, 
which was distributed to participants in both electronic and paper form. Venette's (2003) 
"High Reliability Organization Perception Scale" served as the basis for the 
questionnaire. Barrett, Novak, Venette, and Shumate (2006) tested the scale for 
reliability, factor structure, and validity and found it to be supported in each of these 
categories. Surveys have been effectively used in previous crisis communication 
research. Blendon, Benson, Desroches, and Weldon (2003) used opinion surveys to 
determine who the public trusts, and in what form they prefer to receive information in 
times of national crisis. Procopio and Procopio (2007) focused on internet 
communication in their study of effective use of messages during times of crisis. Barrett 
et al. (2006) used a survey in their validity and reliability testing of Venette's HRO 
perception scale. 
The HRO scale was modified to clearly identify for survey participants that 
perceptions about the university were being gauged. The modification, therefore, was a 
slight one that involved clarifying that the "organization" referenced by the HRO scale 
was the employer, the University of Southern Mississippi. The choice to use the phrase 
"The University of Southern Mississippi (USM)" instead of delineating by work site was 
a deliberate one. The rationale for choosing the institution as a whole as the target for 
garnering employee perceptions, rather than specific sites, reflected the research goal of 
remaining consistent with organizational terminology use. Since perceptions and 
opinions may have varied among employees based on work site, the survey provided 
open-ended questions that allowed for the chance to share opinions about individual work 
sites. 
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Research Design 
The design of the research instrument illustrates the advantage of focusing on one 
organization in a highly detailed manner. This study utilized the high reliability 
organizational perception scale as validated by Barrett, Novak, Venette, and Shumate 
(2006). Barrett et al.'s perception scale is itself based on Venette's (2003) employee 
HRO perception scale. Though this scale relies exclusively on the collection of 
quantitative data, the format allows for a logical adaptation to the needs of an 
organizational survey that will gauge both quantifiable impressions and equally-
important qualitative impressions. The impact of natural disasters on the employees of an 
organization necessitates an understanding of the emotional, psychological, and even 
physical impact of that disaster. The very nature of a natural disaster means the 
organization cannot control or manipulate the locus of the crisis. Therefore, the impact 
on employees - and hence, on the organization - requires inquiry into subjective 
feedback which can then be transformed into useful data. Adapting this level of detailed, 
intricate examination allowed the purpose of the research to remain narrowly focused and 
therefore more likely to yield adaptable information for employers. The results of such 
an intricate analysis can then be used as the basis for future research, such as the analysis 
of differences, if any, between different types of for-profit and non-profit employee 
perceptions of organizational communication during natural disasters. 
Qualitative research design has been successfully used in previous research 
conducted to assess communication around the issue of crisis. Hale, Dulek, and Hale 
(2005) used interview research design for the response stages of crisis situations as 
determined and implemented by crisis decision makers. Mebane, Termin, and Parvanta 
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(2003) also used interviews as a means of analyzing how and why reporters 
misinterpreted data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding 
anthrax threats. Meredith, Eisenman, Rhodes, Ryan and Long (2007) used interviews to 
collect data regarding perceptions that some African-Americans distrust public health 
warnings concerning preparedness for bioterrorist attacks. 
Description of the Organization and the Participants 
The University of Southern Mississippi, founded in 1910, employs 2400 benefits-
eligible faculty and staff, and serves approximately 16, 000 students at two main 
campuses: Hattiesburg in Forrest county, and Long Beach in west Harrison county. 
Employees are also located at additional coastal sites that include a research laboratory in 
Ocean Springs, and teaching sites at Keesler Air Force Base and in Jackson County. The 
University of Southern Mississippi markets itself as a national university for the Gulf 
South. Funding for The University of Southern Mississippi is derived from state support, 
student fees, private donations and federal grants. Thus, the Gulf Coast communities in 
which the university is located have a strong investment in the University of Southern 
Mississippi economically, culturally, and socially. The role of the university within the 
communities in which it is located speaks to the intricate mutual dependence that 
Katrina's impact only served to heighten. 
Participants 
The participants in the survey and interviews were identified, with assistance from 
the Department of Human Resources, from those current employees who were on payroll 
in August 2005 at any of the campus locations listed above. The 1673 employees who fit 
this criterion were invited to participate in the survey process via email. The email 
provided a link to the survey, which was administered by a research group at North 
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Dakota State University. Additionally, employees in jobs that typically do not require 
computer access were invited to participate in the survey process at employee meetings. 
Hard copies of the survey were distributed at staff meetings; 52 employees participated in 
this fashion. 
A total of 843 employees completed at least part of the survey, creating a fifty per 
cent participation rate. Seven hundred participants responded to all questions. Eighty-
five per cent of respondents were Hattiesburg-based employees; 8 per cent were Long 
Beach/Jackson County/Keesler Air Force base employees; 7 per cent were Gulf Coast 
Research Laboratory employees, and the remaining 36 surveys came from employees at 
Stennis Space Center, comprising less than 1% of the surveys returned. Table 1 shows 
the percentages of participated employees from each site who met the survey population 
criteria. 
Table 1 
Percentages of Participated USM Employees from Each Site 
Location 
Hattiesburg 
Gulf Coast* 
GCRL 
Stennis 
No response 
Percentage 
68.8% 
11.86% 
7.71% 
3.08% 
8.54% 
Number 
580 
100 
65 
26 
72 
*includes Long Beach/JacksonCounty/Keesler Air Force Base 
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The Survey 
The survey consisted of basic demographic information allowing participants to 
identify the following characteristics, in addition to the work locations as listed above: 
• number of years of employment with the University of Southern Mississippi 
(USM) at time of Katrina; 
o whether wages are earned on an hourly or salaried basis; 
• age; 
® race; 
© sex. 
The ten questions forming the HRO perception scale were modified as follows to 
meet the specifics of the organization and crisis being addressed: 
1. My opinions are taken into account in the daily operations at The University 
of Southern Mississippi (USM). 
2. My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning within USM. 
3. My actions directly contribute to safeguarding USM's continued existence 
as a successful university. 
4. My actions influence others to prevent significant mistakes at USM. 
5. USM is very concerned about the possibility of making high risk mistakes 
that would jeopardize the organization. 
6. USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could jeopardize the 
organization. 
7. USM emphasizes maintaining effective operations. 
8. USM is committed to correcting shortcomings in their emergency response 
procedures. 
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9. USM's supervisors and managers accept an employee's suggestions about 
important issues when the employee has particular expertise in that area. 
10. USM often over-simplifies when communicating about complex emergency 
response procedures. 
All 10 items were used to form an index using a simple sum. As suggested by Venette 
(2003), reliability was calculated using Cronbach's a (a [633] = .85). Thus, reliability 
was determined to be suitable for the entire scale. 
The remainder of the questions came from two sources. The first is the ad hoc 
crisis response plan the university implemented around the crisis of Katrina, to determine 
to what degree this plan met the communicative needs created by this particular event. 
The response plan was extracted from details of interviews with key administrators in the 
university who implemented the communication that was attempted. There was no 
written response plan. Employee focus group feedback provided the second source of 
questions, particularly the open-ended queries that allowed for individual stories to be 
conveyed. 
Tables 2 through 8 show respondents' self-reported number of years of 
employment with the university, employee group, pay status, sex, race, age, and prior 
experience with a hurricane. 
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Table 2 
Respondents' Self-reported Number of Years of Employment with the University 
Number of years 
Less than 10 years 
1 0 - 19 years 
20-29 years 
30-39 years 
40+ years 
No response 
Percentage 
39.97% 
30.73% 
12.45% 
4.39% 
.59% 
11.86% 
Number 
445 
259 
105 
37 
5 
100 
Table 3 
Respondents' Self-reported Employee Group 
Group 
Staff 
Administrator 
(faculty and non faculty) 
Faculty 
No response 
Percentage 
57.41% 
8.66% 
25.74% 
8.19% 
Number 
484 
73 
217 
69 
Table 4 
Respondents' Self-reported Pay Status 
Pay type Percentage 
Table 5 
Respondents' Self-reported Sex 
Sex Percentage 
Female 
Male 
No response 
58.36% 
32.50% 
9.13% 
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Number 
Salaried 
Hourly 
No response 
65.60% 
25.86% 
8.54% 
553 
218 
72 
Number 
492 
274 
77 
Table 6 
Respondents' Self-reported Race 
Race 
White 
African American 
Hispanic/Latino 
Native American 
Asian 
Percentage 
86.36% 
10.39% 
1.43% 
0.78% 
1.04% 
Number 
665 
80 
11 
6 
8 
61 
Table 7 
Respondents' Self-reported Age 
Age group 
18-25 
26-35 
36-45 
46-55 
56-65 
66-75 
75+ 
No response 
Percentage 
0.36% 
12.22% 
20.05% 
33.21% 
21.35% 
3.56% 
0.00% 
9.25% 
Number 
3 
103 
169 
280 
180 
30 
0 
78 
Table 8 
Respondents' Self-reported Prior Experience with a Hurricane 
Experience Percentage Number 
Yes 69.04% 582 
No 21.59% 182 
No response 9.37% 79 
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Survey Data Description 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative questions allowed for the 
collection of data to address the RQ's listed previously. The pairing of RQ and survey 
data is as follows: 
RQla, RQlb and RQlc data were collected from responses to survey parts I and 
II. Each section addressed perceptions of communication efforts before Katrina-
specifically, one week prior - and after Katrina - specifically, up to one month after the 
Hurricane hit. A checklist of possible methods of communication was listed; respondents 
were asked to indicate all ways in which they received communication from the 
university. Respondents were then asked to rate their perceptions of the efficacy of those 
communication efforts by way of a Likert scale rating which addressed adequacy of 
conformation from the university regarding Katrina. This same format of a checklist, 
followed by a rating of adequacy, formed the basis of parts I and II which became the 
basis for determining response to RQ1, a-c. Additionally, the last question of the survey 
allowed for an open-ended 'last call for feedback" opportunity for respondents to address 
any issue about Katrina and their employer. The total of qualitative data provided for a 
more complete picture of what did and did not work well in terms of communicative 
efforts, as well as other outreach efforts. The three open-ended survey questions 
prompted a response rate which reflects that 26.3% of all respondents provided feedback 
for question #14; 38.8% of all respondents provided feedback for question #15, and 
25.6% of all respondents provided feedback for question #17. 
Finally, open-ended questions 14 and 15 allowed respondents to identify actions 
(communicative or otherwise) that the university undertook both prior to and right after 
Katrina hit. Two hundred-twenty two participants provided written responses to item 14, 
63 
which requested the following feedback: "Please describe anything USM did for you, as 
an employee, that you found particularly helpful right before Katrina hit." Three hundred-
twenty seven participants provided written responses to item 15. Two hundred-sixteen 
participants responded to item 17, which allowed participants to respond to this question: 
"Is there anything you would like to say about Katrina and USM's response to the 
hurricane, that has not been included in this survey? If so, please do so here." Two 
coders tallied comments into the following categories for item 14: 
• time to deal with personal concerns (home, family) 
• facilitated safety: closed campus early, etc. 
• kept employees informed on the storms' status/severity 
• did nothing for me prior to Katrina 
• n/a; nothing to add/say here. 
Comments were tallied into the following categories for item 15: 
• provided food/meals 
• distributed ice/water 
• assured me of job security 
• allowed time for personal concerns 
• got my paycheck on time 
• provided temporary housing 
• provided assistance (other than housing) 
• other. 
Comments were tallied into the following categories for item 17: 
• USM communicated poorly with me 
64 
® USM communicated adequately with me 
® gratitude for what USM did do 
• lack of adequate follow-up from Hattiesburg-based admin(i.e., slow to 
respond, inadequate response, etc.) 
• no/nothing/no response 
® other. 
Training with the two coders involved a review of the open-ended questions, the list of 
generalized categories, and need to remain alert for each unit of measure to contain more 
than one category of response. The coders were given a random sample of 30% of 
responses from each question to individually code. Intercoder reliability was then 
calculated using Scott's pi (Scott, 1955). Pi is the appropriate measure of reliability in 
this instance as the data is nominal (i.e, placed into categories that have not been ranked 
ordered) (Venette, 2006). The calculated reliability coefficients for all three of the open-
ended questions were acceptable. For questions 14, pi equaled .78; for 15, pi was .74; 
and for questions 17, pi totaled .64. 
RQ2 data were collected from responses to the organization-specific HRO 
questions found in Part IV. Part IV provided the data which most specifically addresses 
employees' perceptions of HRO characteristics regarding the university, post-Katrina. 
The HRO questions led to the creation of an HRO score, the results of which formed the 
basis for analysis of HRO perception. 
RQ3a data were collected from responses to the HRO scale in part IV. They were 
correlated with responses found in demographic data regarding numbers of years of 
employment with the university. One-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, as was 
frequency distribution using chi-squared analysis. 
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RQ3b data were collected from responses to the HRO scale in part IV. They were 
correlated with responses found in the demographic data regarding employee work site 
location. One-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, as was frequency distribution using 
chi-squared analysis. 
RQ3c data was collected from response to the HRO scale in part IV. They were 
correlated with responses found in the demographic data regarding employee type, based 
on whether wages were paid on an hourly or salaried basis. One-way ANOVA analysis 
w as conducted, as was frequency distribution with chi-squared analysis. 
Also in relation to RQ3a, RQ3b, and RQ3c, ordinal regression analysis was 
performed to determine the relative contribution of the following variables to 
respondents' perception of USM as an HRO: 
e number of years of employment 
« Work site location 
• Employee type 
Items 10 and 12 were included in the analysis to ascertain the relative contribution of 
perceptions of information adequacy to perception of high reliability. 
Finally, item 17 allowed respondents the opportunity to provide feedback 
regarding any aspect of the organization's interaction with them around the event of the 
hurricane that was not addressed elsewhere in the survey. 
The described methodology has allowed for the collection and interpretation of 
data, findings from which are presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the findings from the data gathered. To review, the data 
were obtained from a written survey which was in turn based upon input gathered from 
individual interviews and employee focus groups. The findings are detailed here, with 
specific findings for the research questions addressed below. 
The first eight questions of the survey sought basic demographic information: 
work location when Katrina hit; number of years of employment at the university; staff or 
faculty designation; hourly or salaried pay status; gender; race; age and prior hurricane 
experience. This information was summarized in the previous chapter. 
Pre-Katrina Information Adequacy Perceptions 
The first three research questions were as follows: RQla: How do employees 
characterize their organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced 
crisis based on length of employment with the organization; RQlb: How do employees 
characterize their organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced 
crisis based on employee work location in relation to the disaster; and RQlc: How do 
employees characterize their organization's communication in response to a natural-
disaster induced crisis based on pay type. Questions 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17 were 
designed to ascertain ways in which the university communicated with employees and to 
what degree, based on those methods used, the communication was perceived as 
adequate. A list of possible information sources remained the same for "prior to" and 
"after" Katrina, for purposes of comparison. Email access is the exception to the list, as 
it is not listed as an option for information source up to one month after Katrina. Table 9 
illustrates the frequency of responses to question nine options. Information received from 
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co-workers, email announcement, and TV announcements received the highest 
percentage of communication type received prior to Katrina. Question 10 asked 
respondents to indicate to what degree they found communication from the university, 
prior to Katrina's arrival to be adequate. 
Table 9 
Ways Received Information One Week Prior to Katrina 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Email 374 (44.4%) 469 (55.6%) 
USM Website 247 (29.3%) 596 (70.7%) 
Dept. Meeting 173 (20.5%) 670 (79.5%) 
Dept. Memo 90 (10.7%) 753 (89.3%) 
USM Announcements 
TV 268(31.8%) 575(68.2%) 
Radio 158(18.7%) 685(81.3%) 
Newspaper 126(14.9%) 717(85.1%) 
Landline Phone 84(10.0%) 759(90.0%) 
Cell Phone 120 (14.2%) 723 (85.8%) 
Info. Co-Worker 385 (45.7%) 458 (54.3%) 
Other 56 (6.69%) 787 (93.4%) 
Note: N = 843 
Table 10 
68 
97 
80 
119 
68 
150 
14.5 
12.0 
17.8 
10.2 
22.5 
Perception of Pre-Katrina Information Adequacy Scale 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly Disagree 85 12.7 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat Agree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 69 10.3 
Total 668 100.0 
Table 10 illustrates the degree to which respondents found information from the 
university about the hurricane in the days prior to Katrina's arrival as adequate. 
A one-way ANOVA was calculated to compare perception of information 
adequacy one week prior to Katrina (M =3.07, SD = 1.94) to number of years of 
employment, work location in relation to the hurricane and pay type. No significant 
differences were found based on number of years of employment (F [6] = 1.61,/? = .14), 
M =2.65, SD = .93; work location in relation to the hurricane (F [6] = 1.06,p = .38), 
M =1.44, SD = .84; or based on pay type (F [6] = 1.83, p = .09), M = 1.72, SD = .45. 
Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of 
information adequacy one week prior to Katrina crosstabulated with the number of years 
of employment. Results did not indicate that the distributions were significantly different 
(x2 = 29.02, p= 52). Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to 
perception of information adequacy one week prior to Katrina crosstabulated with work 
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location in relation to the hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distribution was 
significantly different (x2 [18] = 23.52,/? = .17). Chi square was also performed to 
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy one week 
prior to Katrina crosstabulated with pay type. The data failed to support significant 
differences in the distributions (x2 [6] = 10.94, p = .09). 
Tables Al through A4, located in Appendix D, provide the data from which the 
analysis was drawn. 
Post-Katrina Information Adequacy Perceptions 
Questions 11 and 12 sought perceptions of information adequacy after Katrina hit. 
The survey requested more detailed information about types of information than did the 
pre-Katrina questions. This more detailed response opportunity allowed respondents to 
provide in depth three particular types of information compared - adequacy of job 
security information, paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date - to be analyzed in 
comparison with three separate characteristics: whether an employee receives a paycheck 
biweekly or monthly (i.e. salaried employee); work location of the respondent; and 
number of years of employment with the university. Tables A5-A13 in Appendix D 
illustrate the findings. 
Information Adequacy, Post-Katrina, Regarding Job Security 
A one-way ANOVA (M = 5.17, SD = 1.95) was calculated to compare 
perceptions of information adequacy up to one month after Katrina regarding job security 
based on years of employment, work location in relation to the hurricane, and pay type, 
No significant differences were found based on number of years of employment (F [7] = 
0.48, p - .85); work location in relation to the hurricane (F [7] = 1.14, p = .34); and pay 
type (F [7] = 1.75,/? =.09). 
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Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of 
information adequacy regarding job security up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated 
with the number of years of employment. Results did not indicate that the distributions 
were significantly different (x2 [35] = 25.18, p = .89). Chi square was also performed to 
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy regarding job 
security up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with work location in relation to the 
hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distributions were significantly different (x 
[21] = 36.83,/? = .02), nor were distributions significantly different based on pay type (x 
[7] = 12.18,/? = .10). 
Information Adequacy, Post-Katrina, Regarding Paycheck Retrieval 
A one-way ANOVA (M = 5.17, SD = 1.95) was calculated to compare 
perceptions of information adequacy up to one month after Katrina regarding paycheck 
retrieval based on years of employment, work location in relation to the hurricane, and 
pay type. No significant differences were found based on number of years of 
employment (F [7] =1.83, p = .08); work location in relation to the hurricane (F [7] = .85, 
p = .55); and pay type (F [7] = .99, p = .44). 
Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of 
information adequacy regarding paycheck retrieval up to one month after Katrina 
crosstabulated with the number of years of employment. Results did not indicate that the 
distributions were significantly different (x2 [35] = 30.58,/? = .68). Chi square was 
performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy 
regarding paycheck retrieval up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with work 
location in relation to the hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distribution was 
significantly different (x2 [21] = 27.15,/? = .17). Chi square was also performed to 
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analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy regarding 
paycheck retrieval up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with pay type. The data 
failed to support significant differences in the distributions (x2 [7] = 6.92, p = .44). 
Information Adequacy, Post-Katrina, Regarding Paycheck Retrieval 
A one-way ANOVA (M = 5.21, SD = 1.91) was calculated to compare perceptions of 
information adequacy up to one month after Katrina regarding return-to-work date, based 
on years of employment, work location in relation to the hurricane, and pay type. No 
significant differences were found based on number of years of employment (F [7] =1.84, 
p = .08); work location in relation to the hurricane (F [7] = 1.01, p = .43); and pay type (F 
[7] = .39,/? = .44). 
Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of 
information adequacy regarding return-to-work date up to one month after Katrina 
crosstabulated with the number of years of employment. Results did not indicate that the 
distributions were significantly different (x2 [35] = 31.72, p = .63). Chi square was 
performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy 
regarding return-to-work date up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with work 
location in relation to the hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distribution was 
significantly different (x2 [21] = 29.55,/? = .10). Chi square was also performed to 
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy regarding 
return-to-work date up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with pay type. The data 
failed to support significant differences in the distributions (x2 [7] = 2.72, p = .91). 
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Information Adequacy: Qualitative Results 
Questions 14, 15 and 17 were designed to allow qualitative data collection from 
respondents. Question 14 asked respondents to "Please describe anything USM did for 
you, as an employee, that you found particularly helpful right before Katrina hit." A total 
of 222 respondents (26% of survey respondents) provided comments. Comments fell into 
one of three categories: positive impressions or experiences to share; negative 
impressions or experiences to share; and simply a response of "nothing to add." The 
majority of comments (62%) indicated positive perceptions of communication or action 
on the part of the university prior to Katrina's arrival. Comments of a positive nature 
centered primarily on appreciation for the university's concern for employee safety; 
keeping employees informed about Katrina's status; and demonstrations by the university 
of regard and concern for employees - i.e., time to prepare one's home and family for the 
impending storm. 
Qualitative Results: Positive Feedback, Pre-Katrina 
The following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of 
a positive nature: 
Honestly, did anyone think Katrina would be so devastating? I think it was the 
appropriate information for what everyone was expecting. 
Suggested what to do with office contents in preparation for the storm, and 
informed us where to look for information concerning our return to work. 
Closed the University in time, so I could get ready at home. 
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Made us more aware and letting us prepare our own belongings and personal 
property. 
Thus, subthemes which emerged from the comments of a positive nature were 
appreciation for: evident concern for employee safety; keeping employees informed of 
the storm's path and adequate time to attend to personal safety. 
Qualitative Results: Negative Feedback, Pre-Katrina 
However, 84 (38%) comments reflected negative assessments of actions taken by 
USM prior to Katrina. The following statements are representative of the opinions 
expressed that were of a negative nature: 
Nothing; in fact, there was no communication that the university was closing until 
the day the storm hit. My family and I evacuated prior to the storm; I canceled my 
classes accordingly and well before the university communicated anything to the 
staff, faculty, and (most importantly) the students. 
Nothing. I left work Friday, expecting to return to work Monday, not hearing 
anything about the strength of Katrina and that we were in the path. 
Notice was short. We were asked to come in on Saturday and ready our areas. 
Only two of us came, others were busy readying their homes. Earlier calls to 
ready the campus would have been more effective. 
Thus, subthemes that emerged from the comments of a negative nature included 
lack of adequate warning time, and lack of any information at all. Many comments 
simply stated "nothing." It is unclear if a response of "nothing" is a shorthand of sorts for 
"nothing comes to mind," or "did nothing for me." Based strictly on a response to a 
direct question, however, the answer must be taken at face value, and thus indicated that 
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for some of the participants, a response of "nothing" means "the university did nothing 
for me, as an employee, that I found particularly helpful prior to Katrina." 
Qualitative Results: Positive Feedback, Post-Katrina 
An opportunity for respondents to provide qualitative data regarding perceptions 
of USM's actions after Katrina hit is found in question 15 which asked respondents to: 
"Please describe anything USM did for you, as an employee, that you found particularly 
helpful right after Katrina hit." A total of 327 respondents (38% of survey respondents) 
provided comments. The majority of comments (83%) indicated positive perceptions of 
action taken by the university after Katrina hit. From the comments of a positive nature 
emerged themes of appreciation for the meals, ice and water distributed to employees by 
the university, and assurances from the administration of job security. 
The following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of 
a positive nature: 
Distribution of ice and water; reassurances to all employees that we would get up 
and running as quickly as possible; a strong sense of community concern and 
awareness was communicated; a strong sense that everything that could be done 
was being done. 
I don't remember the date, but it was very encouraging when Thames made the 
announcement that everyone would continue to have a job. 
Meals at the Commons for employees back at work were a great help. 
Meals on GCRL campus, employment security (this was most important, as when 
you lose everything, it is reassuring to know you still have a job!) 
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Qualitative Results: Negative Feedback, Post-Katrina 
However, 56 (17%) comments reflected negative assessments of actions taken by 
USM after Katrina hit. The following statements are representative of the opinions 
expressed that were of a negative nature: 
Nothing. There was no official word from USM. I had to find out from 
coworkers when to return to work. I went back to work and my power was about 
for another month. I was still eating MREs and trying to teach classes. 
I think that people on the Coast figured out a way to communicate. This was a 
Coast thing, not a Hattiesburg thing. We found authorities in Hattiesburg just not 
able to comprehend our problems and offering utterly stupid solutions. It went 
over like a lead balloon when Thames stated at the outside meeting at Long 
Beach, with phone lines down that we will put our courses online — what 
online?? There was no online capability to most faculty houses for MONTHS. In 
fact one third of the faculty was with out even a house for months. 
Communications were down, things were chaotic, finally getting word from one 
of the graduate students that the lab was still up, everyone was alive was the best 
news (but that didn't come from USM, I had no official communication from the 
University whatever). USM didn't play any helpful role until they started to 
expedite FEMA housing in the National Seashore Park for GCRL employees in 
October. 
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Very little. So many other organizations (e.g., public schools) received so much 
more help than did USM. Even the Red Cross visited the Hattiesburg campus, but 
NOT the Gulf Coast campus. 
Subthemes that emerged from the comments of a negative nature include frustration with 
minimal to total lack of any organized communication from the university; perception of 
neglect/disregard for coast-based employees from administration on the Hattiesburg 
campus; and inadequate response when assistance was, in fact, given. 
Qualitative Results: General Comments 
Question 17 gave respondents an opportunity to provide feedback on any topic 
relevant to the university's communication during Katrina by asking: "Is there anything 
you would like to say about Katrina and USM's response to the hurricane, that has not 
been included in this survey? If so, please do so here." A total of 216 respondents (25% 
of survey respondents) provided comments. The majority of comments (69%) indicated 
positive perceptions, and centered mainly on overall impressions about communication 
from the university before and after Katrina. 
General Comments, Positive 
The following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of 
a positive nature: 
When Katrina hit I had not even been working on campus for a month so I was 
not very familiar with the campus and the way in which an emergency would be 
handled. However, I know at that time that we did not have an emergency system 
in place, so no one was aware what to do in case the hurricane did hit our area. 
Since Katrina the University has setup their emergency system and I think it's a 
huge step to get information out to as many people as possible about the daily 
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functions. I think USM is heading in the right direction of being an effective 
communicator to its Faculty, staff and students. 
As a whole, I believe the University did the best they could given the situation. 
Until something happens for a first time it's hard to imagine what it could be like. 
Since then the University has taken many steps to opening up communications 
with the Emergency Notification and 2 way radios for certain vital departments. I 
feel we still have many areas that can be improved upon for emergency response 
but with limited funding it is hard to purchase everything that can be used to help. 
I think that much improvement has taken place in communications infrastructure 
since Katrina, not just university-related but on a broader basis. 
USM stepped up to the plate admirably in a situation none of us, experienced as 
we thought we were, ever expected to happen. Due to the relocation of the Gulf 
Park campus we were all crammed into very small spaces with few computers and 
a few purchased cell phones to share. The feelings of gratitude when seeing 
missing coworkers and the adrenaline rush to keep on moving in the face of 
disaster created a bond I believe will remain forever. We definitely learned a lot 
more about our co-workers and ourselves. A huge upside of the experience was 
learning more about how our jobs overlapped as we had to step up and help 
students in all situations rather than referring them to whoever normally would 
have helped them. We were definitely all in this together. 
Southern Miss did an excellent job taking care of students and community 
members by opening the cafeteria and making rooms available. 
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Responses to the opportunity to give general feedback about any aspect of the 
Katrina experience produced positive subthemes focusing on: appreciation for efforts to 
offer tangible assistance such as food and ice; a sense of bonding in the face of an 
adversary; and appreciation for improved communication, post Katrina. 
General Comments, Negative 
Of the 216 responses to question 17, 67 (31%) were of a negative nature, and 
were, as with the positive comments, focused primarily on communication issues. The 
following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of a negative 
nature: 
There was no communication whatsoever for a week or so after Katrina. I have 
seen nothing to make me think that USM is better prepared now. 
After the storm, it seemed to take FOREVER for the administration to make any 
sort of public announcement, or to provide guidance to staff and others. No doubt 
much was in fact going on, but communications were poor. Later there seemed to 
be an inordinate amount of self-congratulation around how well everything was 
handled. 
Questions 14, 15 and 17 were consistent in the topics, whether of praise or 
criticism, that respondents wanted to convey to the university. These topics include a 
continuum of intense gratitude to intense resentment. Gratitude centered primarily on 
issues of basic survival: time to prepare for Katrina's arrival; information regarding the 
status of the storm; help with food, ice, water and transportation after Katrina; and 
appreciation for the fact that no jobs were lost. The opposing points of view centered less 
on concrete items - food, clothing, job security - than emotional issues: perceptions of 
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lack of regard for costal employees; lack of adequate information after Katrina hit; lack 
of assistance with office recovery or relocation; and perceptions that top administrators in 
Hattiesburg did not - for some respondents, do not - comprehend the psychological as 
well as physical loss some employees suffered. 
High Reliability Organization 
RQ2 asked: To what degree do employees perceive their employing organization 
to be an HRO in the aftermath of a natural disaster-induced crisis? Question 16 allowed 
respondents the opportunity to assess the university as a High Reliability Organization. 
The survey included the ten High Reliability Organization characteristics as created by 
Venette (2003) and adapted for this research project to reflect the nuances of the 
organization studied. Reliability was found to be high with Cronbach's alpha of .848; 
descriptive statistics for the ten HRO questions are presented in Table 11 (1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = 
agree, and 7 = strongly agree). Table 12 lists frequencies, and Table A14, found in 
Appendix D, indicates the frequency distribution based on possible total HRO scores 
ranging from 10 to 70. 
The HRO ranges indicate respondents perceive the university as functioning in a 
High Reliability Organization mode at a percentage of 78.3%; 496 of 633 responses fell 
into the HRO range of high to very high in perception of the university. This percentage 
reflects a solid perception of appropriate crisis response and preparation reliability on the 
part of the survey respondents, three years after Katrina hit. Table 13 lists the overall 
HRO ranges. 
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Table 11 
Descriptives for High Reliability Organization Scale 
HROl 
HR02 
HR03 
HR04 
HR05 
HR06 
HR07 
HR08 
HR09 
HRO10 
N 
682 
676 
675 
674 
670 
676 
676 
676 
680 
674 
Mode 
4 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
Mean 
4.09 
3.93 
5.08 
4.72 
5.00 
4.91 
5.05 
5.47 
4.68 
4.02 
SD 
1.66 
1.64 
1.42 
1.42 
1.42 
1.45 
1.41 
1.19 
1.51 
1.34 
Range 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Note: HROl: My opinion/daily operations 
HR02: My opinion/long-term planning 
HR03: My actions/safeguard 
HR04: My actions/influence 
HR05: USM/concemed, high risk mistakes 
HR06: USM/committed, operations shortcomings 
HR07: USM/emphasizes operations 
HR08: USM/committed, emergency response shortcomings 
HR09: USM supervisors accept my opinion/area of expertise 
HRO10: USM oversimplifies info/emergency response procedure 
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Table 12 
Frequencies for High Reliability Organizations Scale 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Total 
HROl 
HR02 
HR03 
HR04 
HR05 
HR06 
HR07 
HR08 
HR09 
HRO10 
53(7.8%) 
61(9.0%) 
17(2.5%) 
27(4.0%) 
14(2.1%) 
14(2.1%) 
14(2.1%) 
5 (.7%) 
25(3.7%) 
28(4.2%) 
105(15.4%) 
103(15.2%) 
34(5.0%) 
37(5.5%) 
33(4.9%) 
43(6.4%) 
36(5.3%) 
11(1.6%) 
46(6.8%) 
62(9.2%) 
59(8.7%) 
80(11.8%) 
21(3.1%) 
31(4.6%) 
44(6.6%) 
58(8.6%) 
46(6.8%) 
18(2.7%) 
59(8.7%) 
100(14.8%) 
159(23.3%) 
165(24.4%) 
136(20.1%) 
175(26.0%) 
134(20.0%) 
110(16.3%) 
97(14.3%) 
105(15.5%) 
156(22.9%) 
279(41.4%) 
141(23.3%) 
131(19.4%) 
147(21.8%) 
175(26.0%) 
143(21.3%) 
166(24.6%) 
166(24.6%) 
141(20.9%) 
156(22.9%) 
100(14.8%) 
140(20.5%) 
112(16.8%) 
234(34.7%) 
189(28.0%) 
274(33.4%) 
217(32.1%) 
245(36.2%) 
277(41.0%) 
178(26.2%) 
87(12.9%) 
25(3.7%) 
24(3.6%) 
86(12.7%) 
40(5.9%) 
78(11.6%) 
68(10.1%) 
72(10.7%) 
119(17.6%) 
60(8.8%) 
18(2.7%) 
682 
676 
675 
674 
670 
676 
676 
676 
680 
674 
Note: HROl 
HR02 
HR03 
HR04 
HR05 
HR06 
HR07 
HR08 
HR09 
My opinion/daily operations 
My opinion/long-term planning 
My actions/safeguard 
My actions/influence 
USM/concerned, high risk mistakes 
USM/committed, operations shortcomings 
USM/emphasizes operations 
USM/committed, emergency response shortcomings 
USM supervisors accept my opinion/area of expertise 
HRO10: USM oversimplifies info/emergency response procedure 
Table 13 
High Reliability Organization Ranges 
Very Low (10-24) 
Low (25-39) 
High (41-55) 
Very High (56-70) 
Total 
Frequency 
14 
123 
350 
146 
633 
Percent 
2.2 
19.4 
55.3 
23.1 
100 
82 
The first HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
with the following statement: "My opinions are taken into account in the daily operations 
at The University of Southern Mississippi (USM)." A mean score of 4.09 with standard 
deviation of 1.66 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement. 
The second HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
with the following statement: "My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning 
within USM." A mean of 3.93 with a standard deviation of 1.64 indicates that a majority 
of respondents do not agree with this statement, though by a slim margin. 
The third HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
with the following statement: "My actions directly contribute to safeguarding USM's 
continued existence as a successful university." A mean score of 5.08 with a standard 
deviation of 1.42 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement. 
The fourth HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
with the following statement: "My actions influence others to prevent significant 
mistakes at USM." A mean score of 4.72 with a standard deviation of 1.42 indicates that 
a majority of respondents agree with this statement. 
The fifth HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
with the following statement: "USM is very concerned about the possibility of making 
high risk mistakes that would jeopardize the organization." A mean score of 5.0 with a 
standard deviation of 1.42 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this 
statement. 
The sixth HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
with the following statement: "USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could 
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jeopardize the organization." A mean score of 4.91 with a standard deviation of 1.45 
indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement. 
The seventh HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement with the following statement: "USM emphasizes maintaining effective 
operations." A mean score of 5.05 with a standard deviation of 1.41 indicates a majority 
of respondents agree with this statement. 
The eighth high reliability statement asked respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement with the following statement: "USM is committed to correcting shortcomings 
in their emergency response procedures." A mean score of 5.47 with a standard deviation 
of 1.19 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement. 
The ninth high reliability statement asked respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement with the following statement: "USM's supervisors and managers accept an 
employee's suggestions about important issues when the employee has particular 
expertise in that area." A mean of 4.68 with a standard deviation of 1.51 indicates that a 
majority of respondents agree with this statement. 
The tenth high reliability statement asked respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement with the following statement: "USM often over-simplifies when 
communicating about complex emergency response procedures." A mean of 4.02 with a 
standard deviation of 1.34 indicates that a majority of respondents agreed with this 
statement. 
HRO Perceptions and Mediating Factors 
RQ3a asked: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a 
natural disaster-induced crisis, vary based on years of employment with the organization? 
A one-way AN OVA analysis was conducted (M = 3.05, SD = .71) based on length of 
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employment, employee work location in relation to the disaster, and pay type. Data 
revealed no significant difference based on years of employment (F [3] = 1.63, p = 18). 
RQ3b asked: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural 
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the disaster? 
Data revealed no significant difference based on work location in relation to the disaster 
(F [3] = 2.16, p = .09), and RQ3c asked: How do employee perceptions of organizational 
reliability, after a natural disaster-induced crisis, vary based on salaried or hourly 
employment status? Data revealed that three was no significant difference based on pay 
type (F [3] = .09,p = .97). Tables A15, A16 and A17 list the data analyzed and are found 
in the appendix. 
Summary 
Information gleaned from the survey regarding perceptions of information 
adequacy both before and after Katrina, particularly as that information related to job 
security, paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date, revealed that number of years of 
employment is a consistent factor in perception in almost all categories. Specifically, 
employees who had worked for two years tended to be less satisfied with information 
adequacy across all categories, when compared to all other respondents. However, 
longer term employees - those who had worked for the university at least 20 years -
tended to indicate consistently stronger satisfaction with information adequacy in all 
categories. 
Qualitative data revealed overall positive perceptions of the university's 
interaction with and outreach to employees. In all three sections, regarding information 
received prior to Katrina, after Katrina, and general comments, respondents focused on 
perceptions of communication efficacy and perceived levels of preparedness by the 
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university. Perceptions of pre-Katrina communication fell into general positive 
categories of appreciation for employee safety, ample time to attend to employees' 
personal and family needs, and attempts to keep employees apprised of the storm's 
progress. Generalized negative categories, pre-Katrina, included lack of adequate time to 
prepare for the storm, and inadequate information from the university. Perceptions of 
post-Katrina communication fell into similar generalized categories of appreciation for 
employee well-being in the form of basic supplies such as ice, food and water, and 
appreciation for assurances of job security. Negative perceptions included inadequate 
communication in any organized manner from the university, as well as a perception that 
Hattiesburg-based administrators did not adequately respond with assistance equal to the 
need for coastal sites. Reflections regarding pre-Katrina focused on what was conveyed 
when, and by whom, while reflections after Katrina also included perceptions of whether 
or not employees felt valued and cared for after the storm had hit. 
Overall, respondents indicated a strong perception of the university as operating 
in a manner consistent with characteristics of a High Reliability Organization. HRO 
characteristic #2, which asks for perceptions of individual employee impact long term 
organizational planning, is the only characteristic where respondents indicated 
disagreement. The rate at which employees reported a perception that the university 
functions in a manner consistent with HRO's indicates a solid recovery by the 
organization. In particular, the way in which the university communicates operational 
readiness, according to respondents, suggests that organizational learning has in fact 
occurred in the aftermath of Katrina. 
In the next chapter, conclusions, limitations and future research based on this data 
will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Summary 
In the final analysis, this study revealed that the university, in the assessment of 
its employees, responded to a natural disaster crisis in a manner consistent with best 
practices of high reliability organizations. Further, employees indicated overall positive 
perceptions of information adequacy from the university both before and after the 
hurricane ravaged south Mississippi. Finally, what differences do exist regarding 
information adequacy perceptions are within the power of the organization to effectively 
address and adapt in a manner consistent with contemporary organizational crisis 
communication theories. 
Analysis of the data yields information that sheds insight on the ways in which 
organizational communication around the event of a natural disaster crisis is perceived by 
employees. Findings reveal what modes of communication are perceived as the most 
helpful and, therefore, provide direction for what communicative strategies will prove 
most effective. In this chapter, conclusions and implications from the data are addressed, 
limitations of the research are discussed, and areas for future research are suggested. 
It is worth noting the percentage rate of eligible employees who chose to 
participate in the survey. A full 50% of those who were asked to complete the survey did 
so. Only one reminder email was sent out, about four weeks after the initial call for 
participation, resulting in a percentage of responses that allowed for research findings to 
be gleaned from a solid number of participants. 
Conclusions from the survey and implications emerging from it fall into three 
categories: overall perception of communication from the university with employees 
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immediately prior to Katrina; overall perception of communication from the university 
with employees up to one month after Katrina hit; and overall perception of the university 
as operating in High Reliability Organization mode three years after Katrina. Following 
is a summary of each of these categories. Included in the summary by categories are 
implications based on the findings. Following is a discussion of limitations of the 
research, followed by identification of areas for future research. 
High Reliability Organization Assessment 
The data that addressed this particular research question indicate a majority of 
respondents perceive that the university operates in a manner consistent with nine of the 
10 characteristics listed for a high reliability organization. A majority of respondents 
indicated some degree of agreement with the following HRO characteristics: employees' 
opinions are taken into account in the daily operations of the university; employees' 
actions influence others to prevent significant mistakes at USM; employees' actions 
directly contribute to safeguarding USM's continued existence as a successful university; 
USM is very concerned about the possibility of making high risk mistakes that would 
jeopardize the organization; USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could 
jeopardize the organization; USM emphasizes maintaining effective operations; USM is 
committed to correcting shortcoming in their emergency response procedures; USM 
supervisors and managers accept an employee's suggestions about important issues when 
the employee has particular expertise in that area; and lastly, USM does not over-simplify 
when communicating about complex emergency response procedures. A finding of 9 out 
of 10 HRO practices to be perceived by respondents as part of the university's 
operational practice and procedure serves as a solid endorsement of preparedness 
perception. Given the enormity of the event that was Katrina, this robust percentage of 
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identified HRO characteristics implies that perception among employees that the 
university operates in a manner consistent with the best practices of organizations that 
operate in crisis readiness, day in and day out. Such a finding is significant in terms of, at 
minimum, impressions that the employees who survived Katrina hold about their 
employer. 
A slim majority of respondents indicated that one characteristic of high reliability 
organizations does not accurately describe USM operations. The second HRO states, 
"My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning within USM." Assuming that 
the university desires to have employees perceive that their opinions are, in fact, taken 
into account in long-term planning, organizational learning can again occur if current 
opportunities for input are assessed and revised. Such a review would involve a review 
of how input is funneled into the more global goals and objectives of the organization, as 
well as if and how such input is incorporated at the level of individual units. 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) would contend, however, that not all HRO 
characteristics must be manifested in an organization's operations for the presence of 
HRO practices to be acknowledged. Within this framework one HRO characteristic, with 
a relatively close percentage of disagreement by employees, does not negate the strength 
of the overall perception of the university as possessing HRO qualities. The parameters 
of Weick and Sutcliffe's (2001) research, combined with confirmation of the viability of 
HRO characteristics applicability as manifested by Venette's (2003) research, allow for 
the conclusion that the organization studied in this research has effectively integrated 
HRO characteristics into its daily operations, procedures and practices, as reported by the 
respondents who experienced Katrina while in this organization's employ. The 
modification of Venette's (2003) HRO scale proved to be satisfactorily applicable to the 
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university setting, as evidenced by both feedback from the focus groups and from the 
consistency of quantitative data in the survey which addresses HRO characteristics. The 
degree to which these HRO attributes were incorporated into the organization's daily 
operations and long term planning as a function of organizational learning, however, is a 
separate assessment, and is addressed below. 
Implications for Communication, Pre-Katrina Quantitative Data 
The data reveal rich information regarding what forms of communication proved 
to be most useful to employees in the days before Katrina hit. Respondents were asked to 
identify which forms of communication they accessed to receive pre-Katrina information. 
Respondents were offered communication forms that fall, generally, into three types: 
written information directly from the university (email, department memo, and university 
website), information disseminated via media (newspaper, TV, radio) and verbal 
communication (landline and cell phones; information from co-workers; departmental 
meetings). The top three forms of communication utilized by those respondents who did 
indicate getting information pre Katrina came from each the three general categories: 
email (written), information from co-workers (verbal) and TV (media). Among the 
employees who did seek or receive information from the university in the days before 
Katrina hit, three forms of communication emerged as the most accessed: information 
from co-workers, email, and the university's website, respectively. A total of 45% of 
respondents indicated that they received communication about the university from a co-
worker, while 44% percent of respondents received communication from email. The next 
most frequently accessed form of communication pre-Katrina was TV, with 31.8% of 
respondents indicating information from this media outlet. 
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In no category did a majority of respondents seek or receive information. The 
inference one may draw from this fact is based partly in the general comments given 
from respondents when asked about their perception of adequacy of information received, 
with the timeline of Katrina's arrival in south Mississippi. Until two days prior to the 
arrival of the hurricane, most south Mississippians did not realize that Katrina was 
scheduled to make landfall in Mississippi. Further, confirmation that the path of the 
hurricane was scheduled to make landfall in Mississippi came over the weekend of 
August 27, 2005. Almost all university offices were closed and almost all employees 
were not on campus. The fact that most employees had left work on Friday, August 26, 
2005, with no strong confirmation that Katrina would hit their work sites is a factor that 
must be taken into account when assessing organizational communication efforts and also 
the interest level by employees to obtain information. The university was, for all 
practical purposes, caught off guard by the speed with which imminent danger from 
Katrina changed. Consistent with March, Sproull, and Tamuz's (1991) theory that 
organization learning occurs infrequently, the university was initially unprepared for true 
organizational learning. March et al.'s (1991) theory of organizational learning in 
particular acknowledges that organizations, like a public university, do not typically 
operate in a state of high-risk alertness. Therefore, the opportunities for organizational 
learning are both meager (in frequency) and rich (in learning). Katrina proved to be a 
classic example of organizational learning from March et al.'s perspective. 
A common theme regarding pre-Katrina communication in the three written 
comments sections indicated that some employees did not expect communication from 
the university nor did they seek any, because they did not realize that Katrina was headed 
their way. It is important to note, then, that the expectation for communication with 
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employees from the university may not have been as strong as might be assumed. In 
hindsight, the magnitude of Katrina's destruction is enormous. That knowledge 
beforehand was far less certain. 
The percentage of respondents who indicated agreement that they received 
adequate information is almost exactly the same percentage who indicated disagreement. 
The uncertainty lies in the percentage of employees who either indicated they could not 
recall, felt neutral about the adequacy of information received, or who chose to simply 
not answer the question. This level of ambivalence may serve as another illustration of 
employee ambiguity about the expectation for communication that was indicated in 
written comments. In this sense, Heath's (1997) assertion that moments of crisis - even 
impending crisis - are moments for an organization to demonstrate effective 
communication, proved to be a mixed result for the university. The implications of 
Katrina were not fully realized before the hurricane hit, so the expectation of 
communication may not have been fully realized, as well. 
The data do show, however, that the perception of information adequacy before 
Katrina hit varies according to number of years of employment with the university, work 
site location and whether one is paid monthly or bi-weekly. Employees who had worked 
at the university for 11 years or less when Katrina hit indicated higher percentages of 
dissatisfaction with information adequacy than did employees with 12 to 38 years or 
more of employment. Respondents who had been employed by the university for at least 
21 years indicated the highest rate of satisfaction with information adequacy before the 
hurricane arrived. 
Perceptions of pre-Katrina information adequacy also varied according to work 
site location. Employees of the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory in Ocean Springs 
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indicated a much lower rate of disagreement than did employees of the other three sites. 
Employees at Hattiesburg, Long Beach/Gulf Park/Jackson County/Keesler AFB and of 
Stennis Space Center reported similar levels of disagreement with information adequacy. 
Employees at each site but Gulf Coast Research Laboratory indicated almost evenly split 
perceptions of dissatisfaction and satisfaction. Employees of Gulf Coast Research 
Laboratory reported much clearer delineation of satisfaction with information adequacy. 
Perceptions of pre-Katrina information adequacy also varied according to whether 
an employee receives a paycheck monthly (salaried) or bi-weekly (hourly). Salaried 
employees reported an almost 20% higher rate of satisfaction with information adequacy 
than did employees who receive a bi-weekly paycheck based on an hourly rate of pay. 
Hourly employees also indicated a higher percentage of neutral perception about 
information adequacy than did salaried employees. 
There are implications for what forms of communication were more often 
accessed before Katrina hit. Information from co-workers and email emerged as the first 
and second most accessed sources of information, respectively, prior to Katrina. The 
strength of word-of-mouth as a communication sources indicates that a viable crisis 
communication plan for this organization should reflect the usefulness of this person-to-
person contact. Weick's (1988) theory of enacted sensemaking is applicable to the 
university's pre Katrina endeavors in two key ways. Enacted sensemaking suggests that 
people enact the environments that constrain them. In the pre Katrina scenario, reliable 
information that is formally shared by the university did not occur in an organized word-
of-mouth way. That is to say, not all departments held meetings on the Friday before the 
hurricane arrived, not all supervisors engaged in verbal communication with subordinates 
to clarify preparation plans, etc. In this void, then, informal word-of-mouth 
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communication provided the most accessed form giving and receiving information 
relevant to the storm. Additionally, enacted sensemaking is applicable to the pre Katrina 
information dissemination scenario in that it was only after the hurricane hit that a need 
for a systems approach to the crisis became evident. It is important to bear in mind that a 
key factors in pre Katrina communication was the unpredictability of the hurricane's 
path, and its arrival on a weekend. 
Based on the constraints listed above, a viable communication plan for the 
university today would include strategies that recognize the need to clearly articulate 
plans, identify to whom the information should be given, and clarify to whom these 
designated messengers speak. The high use of email also speaks to the ease and 
reliability with which employees turned to this form of communication from their 
employer, to seek and receive information. Email use is of primary importance to a large 
group of employees, but it must be reiterated that email access is not universal and its 
delivery is not predictable. Nevertheless, such an addition to a crisis communication plan 
will provide yet further evidence that organizational learning has occurred. 
There are also several implications for the findings related to perceptions of pre-
Katrina information adequacy. Employees who had been employed at the university two 
years or less may have had more concerns about job security simply because their 
experience with the university as an employer was more limited than colleagues with 
more years as a university employee. If concerns did exist about job security, newer 
employees may have feared a "last hired, first fired" approach if jobs were to be 
eliminated. Given the fact that the longer one had worked at the university when Katrina 
hit, the more satisfied respondents tended to be, there are implications for the university's 
future communication strategies in terms of assurances to newer employees. One may 
94 
also imply that an employees' understanding of how and under what conditions the 
university cuts positions increases with the number of years of employment, thus 
lowering concern about job loss. In other words, the employer and the employee form a 
type of relationship in which the employee feels more certain about ongoing job security 
as years with the university accrue. 
Coombs' (1995) attribution theory provides a lens through which the perception 
differences based on tenure with the organization may be viewed. A key component of 
attribution theory in crisis management requires the organization to address the stability 
factor. Though Coombs talked about attribution theory from a public image perspective, 
the concept applies to organizational communication with employees as well. 
Specifically, in the face of a crisis, employees will want to know to what degree the 
organization can control the event. Certainly no employee expected the university to be 
able to "control" a category 5 hurricane. However, employees with significant time 
investment in the university may have come to expect and appreciate that the university 
would respond in ways that placed the employees' best interests as a priority. 
Implications for Communication, Post-Katrina Quantitative Data 
Survey questions gauging perceptions of information adequacy after Katrina 
focused on more specific types of information than did questions about pre Katrina 
communication adequacy. Three employment-related topics were identified for 
individual assessment: job security, paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date. 
Respondents were asked to again indicate what communication sources they accessed 
after Katrina hit; the list was the same as the pre Katrina list, with one exception. Email 
as an option for post Katrina communication was not given, based on feedback from 
focus groups that indicated that listing email would indicate that it was a viable option. 
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For the vast majority of the focus group participants, email was not, in fact, considered a 
viable post-Katrina communication option for up to one month after the hurricane hit. 
Data concerning employee perceptions of information adequacy regarding job 
security did differ based on work site location. This difference is manifested in the less 
than 7% disagreement rate among Gulf Coast Research Laboratory respondents, 
compared to the 20% range of disagreement at the other three work site locations. 
Perceptions of information adequacy regarding job security did not differ based on 
number of years of employment or on pay type. 
Data concerning employee perceptions of information adequacy regarding 
paycheck retrieval differed based on years of employment and work site location. 
Difference based on years of employment illustrates, as with pre Katrina data, that 
employees of two years or less when Katrina hit were not in agreement in higher 
percentages than other employees, regarding perceptions of adequate information. The 
difference was also the same as that described for job security perception regarding 
percentage of disagreement among Gulf Coast Research Laboratory respondents, 
compared with respondents from the other work site locations. Perceptions of 
information adequacy regarding paycheck retrieval did not differ based on pay type. 
Data concerning employees perceptions of information adequacy regarding 
return-to-work date differed based on years of employment. Respondents with less than 
11 years of employment when Katrina hit were in more disagreement with information 
adequacy than were employees with 11 or more years. Perceptions of information 
adequacy regarding return-to-work date did not differ based on work site location or on 
pay type. 
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The fact that perceptions of information adequacy regarding job security, 
paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date are not impacted in significant ways by 
location, years of employment or whether one is paid an hourly rate or salaried serves as 
evidence of the implementation of two of Weick and Sutcliffe's (2001, 2007) 
characteristics of high reliability organizations. Among the five characteristics of 
successful HRO's, the university implemented two in definitive ways. First, they 
remained sensitive to operations when they adequately disseminated information about 
how employees were to receive paychecks. Further, the fact that paychecks were 
distributed, in the face of post hurricane chaos, speaks to the second characteristic, which 
is maintaining capabilities for resilience. Assuring that no employee lost a pay period 
served as an indication that the university was still functioning and in a manner of 
importance to employees: receiving one's paycheck. Maintaining capabilities for 
resilience was equally manifested by the fact that a return-to-work date was established, 
and information about it appropriately disseminated. 
Data also revealed that, in regard to forms of communication accessed, word-of-
mouth remained the most frequently used mode, followed by announcements shared with 
TV stations. The third most frequently used mode of communication was the university 
website. The same general categories of communication mode for the day prior to 
Katrina apply for post Katrina: written information directly from the university (email, 
department memo, and university website), information disseminated via media 
(newspaper, TV, radio) or verbal communication (landline and cell phones; information 
from co-workers; departmental meetings). What did change was the medium used for 
direct information from the university, with the website receiving the largest percentage 
of use during this period, in the absence of email listed as an option for respondents. 
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Implications for the organization based on what respondents shared about post-
Katrina sources of information, coupled with input about specific types of information, 
suggest that, as with pre Katrina communication, the respondents with the least number 
of employment years disagreed with information adequacy perceptions to a greater 
degree than did respondents with at least three years on payroll. This difference may 
speak to the uncertainty that a newer employee feels regarding his status with the 
university on all levels: job security, how to get paid and when/if to return to work. A 
crisis communication plan that provides the university's philosophical stance regarding 
job security and payroll assurances, in particular, may alleviate anxiety when the next 
natural disaster crisis occurs. If an employee knows beforehand that it is the goal of the 
organization to maintain employee numbers and to honor payroll obligations to the 
degree feasible during times of crisis, then all employees, regardless of time invested in 
the university, may feel a greater sense of security. 
As with pre-Katrina communication, respondents from the Gulf Coast Research 
Laboratory were, overall, more often in agreement with information adequacy on all 
levels than were their counterparts at the other work site locations. The implication for 
this phenomenon is not entirely evident. The difference may be a function of their work 
site location in relation to where the greatest damage occurred on the coast. It may well 
be a function of the intergroup dynamics among employees at this particular site. Further 
research exclusively with Gulf Coast Research Laboratory employees could prove to be 
an exemplary model of Perrow's (1994) loose coupling theory of organizational structure. 
The geographical size of the site, the relatively small number of employees there and the 
inevitable crossover of roles in smaller, independent settings may, upon further review, 
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determine that this particular component of the larger organization operated effectively 
because adjustments could be made, made quickly and to best outcome. 
Information shared in written comments enabled a fuller assessment of 
communication from the university, both before and after Katrina arrived, to emerge. 
Notably, even though the wording of the open-ended questions did not ask that 
respondents focus only on communicative interaction from the university, 
communication was, in fact, the theme of the majority of comments. Embedded in the 
assessments of communication were clues as to the kinds of communication that seemed 
to matter the most, and it is this information that holds great potential for organizational 
learning. Consistent themes under a general rubric of "communication" included ways in 
which the university communicated - or failed to communicate - concern for the 
employee's welfare, and that of his family. Adequate opportunity to attend to personal 
safety, preparation and recovery were cited as both exemplary and lacking. Though the 
majority of comments in each of the three open ended questions were of a positive nature, 
up to 30% of comments were not. Yet, the basic theme of communication was 
consistent. Thus, the university has an opportunity to review crisis communication 
policies and procedures to ensure that not only is adequate preparation and recovery time 
afforded to employees, but that assurance of such are effectively communicated to 
employees. This organizational accommodation to the need for employees to attend to 
basic needs is consistent with Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs, in which food, safety, 
protection and care are primary. The acknowledgement of the need to make secure one's 
basic needs, as a majority of respondents felt the university did, also speaks to Mitroff et 
al.'s (1987) insistence that attending to employees' coping mechanisms enhances the 
efficacy of a systems approach in crisis management. 
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Implications for Communication from Qualitative Data 
An equally important opportunity for organizational learning emerged from 
written comments regarding those actions taken by the university that communicated to 
employees concern for basic survival needs. In this broad category, employees 
commented on their gratitude for ice, water and food provided by the university after the 
hurricane had left massive devastation. A message of care and concern for employee 
well-being that was communicated through actions turned out to be as powerful to 
employees as what was communicated verbally and in writing. Thus, the university has 
the opportunity to further enrich its natural disaster communication plan by formalizing 
and planning for outreach efforts that reinforce the desire to see that basic employee 
needs are met, to the degree possible. These acts of assistance from the university can be 
analyzed in light of Seeger and Ulmer's (2002, 2003) research, as concrete examples of 
integrating an organization's moral imperative to respond in an ethical manner with 
employees during times of crisis. Technically, the university as employer had no legal 
responsibility to ascertain if employees needed food, water, ice, clothing or shelter. 
However, the university chose to assume this caretaker role and in doing so, made a 
statement of investment in employees that is consistent with the ethical imperative 
suggested by Seeger and Ulmer. 
Further, the qualitative data served to confirm the use of impression management 
strategies as described by Allen and Caillouet (1994). The university, they would 
maintain, actively engaged in behavior that would reinforce for employees the 
organization's viability. The clear, emphatic declaration that no jobs would be lost may 
be the single most definitive moment in the university's impression management efforts 
after Katrina. Having the chief executive officer of the university stated publicly and 
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with no ambiguity that the university would re-open and no paychecks would be missed, 
constituted a symbolic gesture while simultaneously serving as a needed reassurance to 
employees. 
Organizational Learning Assessment 
A key objective of this study was to determine if organization learning occurred 
for this organization in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Further, this research project 
sought to ascertain whether or not organizational learning was manifested to the degree 
that employees perceive the organization as utilizing, post crisis, characteristics of high 
reliability organizations. Based upon the parameters of organizational learning as 
presented in chapter two, the results are mixed. 
To the degree that Seeger and Ulmer's (2003) criteria for organizational learning 
are applied, the university did engage in active organizational learning on at least one 
level. The university accommodated experience, it can be argued, based on how 
employees perceive the university, post Katrina. The assessment in both the qualitative 
feedback and in the rating of the university as adopting nine of the ten HRO 
characteristics lends credence to the assertion that experience provided lessons, and the 
organization adapted accordingly. By whatever means the university did so, it has 
created what can safely be interpreted, based on the survey, as an organization in which 
its employees believe management operates in a manner alert for, and ready to respond, 
to crisis. What cannot be adequately assessed by this study is the degree to which 
information was accommodated by the university. One may presume that information 
gleaned from experience was accommodated, but it is only a presumption. The study did 
not include a pre-Katrina assessment of HRO characteristics; therefore, reliable analysis 
of the degree to which information was absorbed cannot be statistically verified. 
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Based on Cohen and Sproull's (1996) three pronged test for organizational 
learning one may conclude that the university did engage in organizational learning by at 
least two of the three criteria. The learning gleaned created knowledge that is manifested 
in procedure, as is evidenced by employee perceptions of HRO characteristics; the results 
of the learning are, based on the data, retained among interactions within the 
organization, again evidenced by perceptions of HRO characteristics; and the learning 
may have provoked change. This final criteria, as stated earlier, cannot be statistically 
ascertained because no pre-Katrina perception among employees of HRO organizational 
functionality does not exist. 
Further Implications 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge regarding organizational crisis 
communication in that it successfully applies, for appropriate analysis, theoretical 
frameworks that typically are not used for internal organizational communication in times 
of crisis. More specifically, this research illustrates the applicability of crisis 
communication theories, originally designed for man-made crises, to natural disaster 
crises where human error cannot be assigned. This contribution enriches the small body 
of research available regarding communication with one's employees, not one's public 
constituents, in the face of natural disaster crisis. Examples of external crisis 
communication strategies applied to internal crisis communication endeavors are offered 
below. 
Impression management theory, established by Allen and Caillouet (1994) proved 
to be a viable theory for analysis of intra-organizational communication, not just to one's 
public stakeholders. Impression management requires that the organization become an 
intentional actor in shaping - or even re-shaping - its image. Allen and Caillouet 
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envisioned impression management as a strategy for arguing an organization's ongoing 
viability in the face of man-made crisis. In this manner, organizational legitimacy 
required the implementation of apologia, an attempt to repair damaged image. Further, 
the organization attempts to re-establish the positive impressions of the organization held 
by the public prior to the crisis. 
It is this particular component of impression management, more so than apologia, 
that proved to be effective and applicable to this instance of internal organizational crisis 
communication. When the university president spoke clearly and publicly from the back 
of a pick up truck to a group of employees who had lost all semblance of normal life, he 
successfully employed attributes of impression management in two significant ways. 
First, he assured the ongoing viability of the organization by declaring that the university 
would reopen and that jobs would not be eliminated. And, he called upon the assumption 
that these employees to whom he spoke trusted that the university would "make good" on 
its word, that an assurance of ongoing viability held legitimacy for them. Based upon 
what both the qualitative and quantitative data revealed, this assumption was a correct 
one. He was able to call upon the perceptions employees held prior to the crisis and 
reinforce the assurance that while homes, offices and a sense of safety were now gone, 
employment with a still-viable organization remained. 
To some degree, Coombs' (1995) attribution theory was also enacted when the 
university president made his on-site pronouncement that the university would remain 
open and jobs would not be lost. Attribution theory is grounded in the concept that, as 
with impression management, a reframing of the crisis must be offered so that the public 
has an alternative way in which to view the organization, post crisis. It is true that the 
natural disaster crisis which was Katrina did not require an explanation per se from the 
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organization. For example, there was no need to assign blame for the hurricane, and no 
need to deny its existence. Yet, when the continued viability of the university and the 
continued employment was assured by the president, he invited employees to consider 
the crisis through two new perspectives. 
The first perspective utilized the element of minimizing, a key component of 
attribution theory. Minimizing allowed the president to assure employees that things 
were not as bad as they may seem, in that jobs would not be lost. The other key 
component of attribution which the president used is ingratiation; in this instance, in the 
form of bolstering. Again, perceptions shared by survey participants in both qualitative 
and quantitative data confirm that this assurance provided a bolstering morale for the 
coast employees in particular, who were facing almost total devastation. 
In similar fashion, this case study also confirms that the concept of high reliability 
organizations and the characteristics of them as described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 
2007) can be successfully applied to a non-profit organization, an educational 
organization and a multi-site organization, separately or, as is the case of this study, all 
three components in one organization. True, Venette (2003) successfully applied HRO 
characteristics to a non-profit agency - in his study, a branch of the United States 
Department of Agriculture which works with risk assessment scenarios at United States 
ports. Thus, in terms of applicability of HRO characteristics to a non profit organization, 
this study only adds further confirmation of the viability based on that characteristic. 
What makes this study's contribution to the field of organizational crisis communication 
noteworthy, however, is that, unlike the kind of government organization that Venette 
(2003) surveyed, a public university such as the one surveyed for this study does not 
typically operate in an environment of high risk. 
104 
The applicability of high risk organizations to a low risk educational environment 
confirms that organizational learning, as espoused by Seeger and Ulmer (2003), can 
occur by combining experience with information. This particular university chose to 
combine the experiences gained from a crisis like Katrina and learn from it via 
information gathered from employees. The information gathered speaks to high 
reliability practice perception of the organization by its employees. This study illustrates 
the applicability and even the practicality of organizational learning when assessed 
through the lens of high reliability organizational practices. In this context, then, the 
contribution to the field is a strong one. It verifies that HRO characteristics can, in fact, 
provide a model for improving practices, procedures and even perceptions for 
organizations that do not operate in a daily high risk environment but which nevertheless 
are vulnerable on a daily basis to some kind of risk. 
Limitations jH§k 
This study presents results with limitations. As with all research, the limitations 
that create the boundaries of the research must be identified and factored into the 
significance of the outcomes. The limitations of this particular project are identified here. 
This study focused on only one organization among hundreds of organizations 
that faced communication issues, post-Katrina. While one strength of the research may 
be the in-depth analysis that results from a case study's intense examination of one 
organization, it also limits the options for comparison. Applicability to other 
organizations, therefore, may be limited. The size of the organization, the number of 
employees and the numerous work site locations may confound the relationship or 
usefulness of the data to smaller organizations. 
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This study is also constrained by the time lapse between the time of Hurricane 
Katrina in August 2005 and the distribution of the survey in December 2008. Three years 
have passed since Katrina hit the university campuses. The potential for faded memories 
or even no recollection at all may play a factor in outcomes. Similarly, the usefulness of 
the data collected is somewhat limited because no pre-Katrina survey of employees' 
perceptions of organizational communication practices had been administered. The data 
regarding efficacy of communication practices would have resulted in a potentially more 
robust outcome had the communicative efforts after Katrina been measured against pre-
Katrina perceptions prior to August 2005. 
The survey is also limited in that a stringent comparison of employee perceptions 
of communication could not realistically be assessed between the time period of one 
week prior to Katrina and one week after Katrina. Feedback gleaned from focus groups 
confirmed that so little communication was possible in the week following Katrina that, 
by necessity, a wider time period needed to be allowed for true assessment of post-
Katrina communicative efforts. Further, the categories of immediate needs regarding 
communication after Katrina also emerged from the focus groups. The groups clarified 
that a general assessment of employee perception of adequacy of information shared 
would not capture helpful information. Rather, the focus groups urged the assessment of 
three key employee concerns in the weeks immediately following Katrina: job security, 
assurances of regular paycheck distribution and information regarding when to return to 
work. Therefore, though useful, these specific areas of information make a true 
comparison with wider general perceptions of pre-Katrina communication adequacy 
more difficult. 
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A change in leadership at the highest levels of the organization, between the time 
that the hurricane hit until the distribution of the survey, may have limited the accurate 
assessment of organizational communication as it was implemented from the highest 
levels. The university president in office when Katrina hit in 2005 had retired from his 
post eighteen months before the distribution of the survey. Wood (1999) demonstrated 
the vital role of the charisma and communicative ability of a university president in her 
research regarding internal communication channels in higher education. Thus, changes 
in presidential leadership and accompanying changes in communication styles may have 
impacted employee perceptions of crisis communication readiness. Similarly, Hwang 
and Cameron (2009) determined that the perception of the person conveying information 
to an organization in times of crisis - and that person typically is the chief executive 
officer - does impact the perception of the severity and meaning of the crisis to recipients 
of the message. 
Effective communication from an organization under the leadership of a new 
president may color respondents' perceptions and memories of communication from the 
organization as it occurred under previous presidential leadership at the time of the 
hurricane. The qualitative data gleaned from the survey's open-ended questions indicated 
that a noteworthy percentage of those who provided written comments (up to 30% of the 
comments) indicated frustration-to-anger with communication from the university, via 
the administration, at that time. On the other hand, the HRO scale questions asked 
respondents to focus only on their current perceptions of the university. Responses 
indicated a strong perception of a university that operates in a manner consistent with 
HRO organizations. The change in variable of leadership must be noted as a limitation of 
this study. The communication at the time of the hurricane fell to the responsibility of a 
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previous president; the current president inherited post-Katrina communication channels 
to create and refine. 
Massey and Larson (2006) researched the impact of management response to 
crisis in which the issue of credibility of the crisis management team, a team designated 
by the organization's chief officer. Their study confirmed that the crisis plan itself is only 
as effective as the perception of the team that enacts it. In their study, the management 
team, spearheaded by top management, was able to effectively engage in crisis 
management in part because employees and the public both perceived the leadership team 
to be credible. The absolute necessity of respected leadership at the top, particularly 
during times of crisis, was reinforced by Schoenberg (2005) when he employed the 
phrase "reputation management" to describe that key credibility issue of the Chief 
Executive Officer. The degree that perceptions of communication efficacy right before 
and right after Katrina are different when compared with perceptions at the time of the 
survey distribution cannot be appropriately measured based on the data at hand. Thus, 
the impact of perceptions of president leadership in during this particular crisis may limit 
the scope of final analysis. 
Lack of input from former employees who were employed by the university when 
Katrina hit also limits a full picture of information adequacy perception. Because this 
group was not surveyed, we cannot fully know of two key factors. First, we cannot 
ascertain what their perceptions were, and thus have a more robust assessment of 
information adequacy. Equally important, too, is the uncertainty regarding to what 
degree, if any, the hurricane and the university's response to it impacted the factors that 
led to employment separation on the part of these former employees. 
Finally, a clearly agreed-upon definition of what is meant by "USM" when 
completing the survey was, likely, not possible among respondents. Assumption of this 
limitation is based upon focus group feedback in which much discussion ensued 
regarding "whom" or "what" is USM: is it the university as a whole? The administration 
at the Hattiesburg campus? An employee's individual work site location? It was 
determined that for the purposes of treating the university as an HRO, the term would 
remain undefined in any way other than "The University of Southern Mississippi." 
Therefore, the risk exists that respondents' feedback varied based on differing 
perceptions of what "the university" means, by what is included in the concept of "the 
university." 
On the other hand, this confusion may not, in fact, truly be confusion. It may 
instead serve as an example of Seeger's (2002) chaos theory in action. Seeger 
maintained that a natural disaster crisis is actually the perfect venue for chaos theory to 
be enacted. When usual forms of communication break down, when traditional forms of 
leadership are unavailable or inaccessible, chaos theory posits that persons in 
organizations re-group and create a new reality, at least for the duration of the crisis 
event. Viewed in this way, the failure of "USM" as Hattiesburg guided organization in 
the eyes of some coastal employees, allowed for new alliances. Certainly, the strong 
sense of unity among the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory would speak to an enactment 
of chaos theory. And, despite perceptions among some Gulf Park employees of 
abandonment by Hattiesburg, new campus alliances among that group, perhaps, formed 
and functioned in a leadership void. 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
Limitations of the research can logically point the way toward topics for future 
research. For example, more specific information regarding employee perceptions of 
HRO practices may emerge if each work site location were surveyed, with questions 
posed to employees at each site, specific to each location. Such information could help 
identify strengths and weaknesses of each site, and lead to improved communication 
system-wide. Data from respondents who work at the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory 
suggest that further feedback from that particular employee group may yield information 
about to what degree and how Seeger's (2002) chaos theory was implemented 
effectively. Why did employees at this site ultimately report lower levels of 
dissatisfaction with university communication efforts than did their colleagues at other 
sites? The data suggests that the degree to which this particular work site regrouped after 
the hurricane hit may be a factor of chaos theory in action. This perception can be 
verified through follow-up surveys, at all sites, that incorporate elements of chaos theory. 
Such a site-by-site survey may yield data that can inform the potential need for 
stronger communicative ties between sites. Individual site surveys for "best practices" 
may be especially helpful at the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory, since perceptions of 
information adequacy among employees there, particularly after Katrina hit, tended to be 
higher than their coastal colleagues working at other sites. Subjecting the Gulf Coast 
Research Laboratory to further analysis would prove consistent with Heath's (1997) 
research, indicating the need for organizations to demonstrate a commitment to 
heightened attention to communication, and to responsibly make adjustments in the 
aftermath of crisis. 
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Further research exclusively with Gulf Coast Research Laboratory employees 
could prove to be an exemplary model of Perrow's (1994) loose coupling theory of 
organizational structure. The geographical size of the site, the relatively small number of 
employees there and the inevitable crossover of roles in smaller, independent settings 
may, upon further review, determine that this particular component of the larger 
organization operated effectively because adjustments could be made, made quickly and 
to best outcome. 
Further research opportunities also exist with a closer examination of word-of-
mouth communication channels, based on the reported strength of this type of 
communication, both before and after Katrina. Billings, Milburn and Schaalman (1980), 
almost three decades earlier, identified the need for employers to lessen the opportunity 
for employee emotional inoculation to set in by ever anticipating and revising 
communication strategies. The more information an employee has, the less likely he is to 
experience emotional inoculation, a form of stress and anxiety that can cause emotional 
paralysis. Since word-of-mouth forms of communication proved to be the most effective 
for employees both before and after Katrina hit, the university will benefit from more 
detailed, thorough information about how the verbal channels emerged. Kiger (2001) 
spoke to the need for relying on unconventional communication methods after the World 
Trade Center crisis and foretold the Katrina crisis of no technology available to use for 
communication. More in-depth survey of the various kinds of word-of-mouth 
communication may prove beneficial as the university assesses current crisis 
communication plans. More information about what persons or organizations served as 
the conduit for word-of-mouth communication may yield heretofore underutilized 
sources. For example, word-of-mouth information may be transmitted in certain 
I l l 
formalized settings, such as places of worship or through civic organizations. An in-
depth study of word-of-mouth communication may determine that more employees get 
information in this mariner from co-workers than supervisors, or from neighbors. The 
source of the verbal communication may, ultimately, inform the veracity of the 
information shared. 
The university should consider surveying those former employees who were on 
payroll when Katrina hit. Determining to what degree the hurricane prompted their 
separation from the university would potentially strengthen the usefulness of the survey. 
More specifically, the university has the potential to gain insight into whether or not the 
university's communicative responses to the hurricane impacted the circumstances that 
led to the employees' separation from the organization. 
Further research is also warranted in the area in which employees indicated 
disagreement with high reliability organizational practices. With feedback from the 
survey indicating that a majority of respondents do not feel that individual input is 
routinely taken into account in organizational long term planning, follow up research 
with this organization may reveal to what degree and in what manner this perception is 
being communicated. Consistent with Pearson and Mitroffs (1993) research confirming 
the correlation between an organization's acknowledgment of the expertise of employees 
with their sense of personal accountability when the organization faces crisis, the 
university will benefit from follow up research on this particular HRO characteristic. 
Failure to further examine this perception by employees may cause employees to engage 
in what Novak (2006) described as benign mindlessness. This phenomenon occurs when 
employees feels their opinions do not matter; therefore, they becomes less likely to 
maintain a mindful approach to work practices and procedures. Thus, an in-depth follow 
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up within the university may, in turn, result in meaningful application for similar 
organizations, particularly organizations that are engaged in nonprofit endeavors. 
Overall, more case studies of organizations affected by Katrina, such as institutions of 
higher education, non profit agencies, and for profit businesses, will enrich the data 
currently available about effective communication practices in natural disaster crises. The 
variety of organizational goals, sizes and locations will provide more depth of insight. 
Final Summary 
Organizations cannot control the occurrence of natural disasters. Within their 
control, however, is how they communicate with their constituents before, about and after 
such a disaster. This study has provided a basis from which organizations can compare 
and assess what they want to communicate to that crucial stakeholder, the employee. In 
times of natural disaster, what is communicated internally within an organization is as 
important as what is conveyed to the public. Scholars in the communication field have an 
opportunity to enhance the practice of effective organizational communication with 
employees. This kind of practical application of systematic inquiry partners the 
academician with the administrator. The end result may not only ensure the survival of 
the organization in times of hurricane, tornado, flood or other natural disasters, but do 
likewise for employees. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD MATERIALS 
TO: USM Institutional Review Board 
FROM: ebecca N. Woodrick 
DATE: November 17, 2008 
RE: Request for Approval to Survey 
Statement of Project Goals: 
The goal of this project is to assess perceptions of communication efficacy between The 
University of Southern Mississippi (USM) and its employees when Katrina hit during 
August 2005. The information used will serve as the basis for feedback to the university 
as it updates its Crisis Communication Plan. 
Protocol Information 
A survey will be distributed to current USM employees who were on payroll during 
August 2005. A total of 1700 employees will be invited to participate in the survey. 
The survey will be distributed both online and in print. A private entity has been selected 
to collect the data online, thus reducing the opportunity for participants to be identified 
based on port. Handwritten surveys will be available upon request, and will be sent with 
pre-addressed return envelopes. 
The survey will take no more than 15 minutes to complete. A copy of the survey is 
attached. It is titled "Employee Perceptions of Communication from The University of 
Southern Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina." Also attached is a copy of the request to 
President Martha D. Saunders, which she approved. Verbal support of the survey was 
also given by President Saunders in a meeting in which Professor John Meyer was 
present on September 19, 2008. 
Participants in the survey will be 18 years of age or older. 
Benefits 
This project has the potential to: 
© Allow employees to give feedback that will assist in adopting a 
useful and informed Crisis Communication Plan for the institution; 
• Allow the university to assess what went well and what needs 
improvement regarding internal communication with employees, 
particularly during time of natural disaster crisis. 
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Risks 
This project has the potential to elicit in respondents reactions to memories of hurricane 
Katrina. The survey itself will contain information regarding how to access counseling 
services should they feel the need to do so. 
Confidentiality of the process will be promised in written.form when the request-to-
participate email or letter is sent. It is reiterated in the introductory remarks of the 
survey. 
The data will be retained by The Group Decision Center in Fargo, ND until the principal 
investigator requests that it be destroyed. All written copies of the survey will be 
shredded after the data has been entered into the online survey. 
Informed Consent 
A wavier of the consent form is requested. The vast majority of participants will take the 
survey online, the submission which will indicate agreement to participate. Further, both 
online and written survey forms will indicate (1) the nature of the survey (2) the 
confidentiality of the information shared and (3) ways to access assistance should 
emotional issues emerge from having participated in the survey. 
Attachments: Permission to survey employees 
Survey 
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THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI 
118 College Drive #5147 
Institutional Review Board Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001 
Tel: 601.266.6820 
Fax: 601.266.5509 
www.usm.edu/irb 
HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION REVIEW COMMITTEE 
NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION 
The project has been reviewed by The University of Southern Mississippi Human Subjects 
Protection Review Committee in accordance with Federal Drug Administration regulations 
(21 CFR 26,111), Department of Health and Human Services (45 CFR Part 46), and 
university guidelines to ensure adherence to the following criteria: 
• The risks to subjects are minimized. 
• The risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits. 
• The selection of subjects is equitable. 
• Informed consent is adequate and appropriately documented. 
• Where appropriate, the research plan makes adequate provisions for monitoring the 
data collected to ensure the safety of the subjects. 
• Where appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and 
to maintain the confidentiality of all data. 
• Appropriate additional safeguards have been included to protect vulnerable subjects. 
• Any unanticipated, serious, or continuing problems encountered regarding risks to subjed 
must be reported immediately, but not later than 10 days following the event. This should 
be reported to the IRB Office via the "Adverse Effect Report Form". 
• If approved, the maximum period of approval is limited to twelve months. 
Projects that exceed this period must submit an application for renewal or continuation. 
PROTOCOL NUMBER: 28111702 
PROJECT TITLE: Assessment of Communication With Employees During 
Hurricane Katrina 
PROPOSED PROJECT DATES: 11/25/08 to 03/25/09 
PROJECT TYPE: Dissertation or Thesis 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS: Rebecca Nell Woodrick 
COLLEGE/DIVISION: College of Arts & Letters 
DEPARTMENT: Speech Communication 
FUNDING AGENCY: N/A 
HSPRC COMMITTEE ACTION: Expedited Review Approval 
PERIOD OF APPROVAL: 11/24/08 to 11/23/09 
Date Lawrence A. Hosman, Ph.D. 
HSPRC Chair 
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HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW FORM Protocol # 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI (office use only) 
(SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE) 
N a m e R e b e c c a Nell Woodrick 
E-Mail Address rebeccawooc'rick@usm.edu 
Mailing Address Box 5168, USM 
(address to receive information regarding this application) 
Coiiege/Divlsion C Q A L 
Department Box # 5131 
11/25/08 
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THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI 
Office of Affirmative Action and Equal 118 College Drive #5168 
jurg, MS 39406-0001 
601.266.6618 
www.usm.edu/aa-eeo 
Emblement Opportunity „ Hattiesb r ,  O  
" . .  
TO: . President Saunders 
FROM: l-y Becky Woodrick 
DATE: September 19, 2008 
RE: Research request 
I request permission to survey current USM employees who were also on payroll in 
August 2005, as the basis for my dissertation research associated with my pursuit of a 
speech communication doctoral degree here at Southern. My area of concentration in 
the program is organizational crisis communication. 
My goal is to assess employee impressions of the quantity and quality of 
communication they had with the university, as their employer, during the crisis that was 
hurricane Katrina. Access will take two forms: multiple focus group interviews and an 
online survey (hard copies will be available upon request). I have chosen this topic 
because little research exists regarding how to effectively communicate, in times of 
natural disaster crisis, with an organization's employees. They are, arguably, the most 
important stakeholder group within an organization. Yet in-depth analysis of and 
detailed framework for natural disaster communication crisis with employees is curiously 
absent from the literature. 
Participation in the survey will be entirely voluntary, and employee identity will be kept 
confidential. The confidentiality of all participants would be maintained in a final report 
given to you on the findings of the survey. As you are well aware, this degree of 
confidentiality is crucial to the success of the survey. 
I request from you the following: 
» Your written approval to Human Resources, so I may use the above-described 
employee group (approximately 1700 persons) for my survey group; 
• Access to the university's communication crisis plan that was implemented in 
August 2005, as well as the current plan. 
Potential benefits to USM for having allowed me survey these employees include: 
« A statistical and organizational analysis of employees satisfaction with the 
communication they received from the university during and after hurricane 
Katrina (this information can be used to confirm efficacy and/or provide feedback 
on how to improve upon communication); 
• Potential for positive public recognition as a case study in organizational 
communication with employees in times of crisis; 
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• A summary presentation of the findings, both written and verbal, to you and other 
university administrators of your choosing. 
The degree to which the university may choose to remain anonymous in the publication 
of the dissertation, and in any subsequent research based on the dissertation, is entirely 
at your discretion. 
My goal is to conduct the survey no later than the end of this semester. 
Thank you for your consideration of this request. 
1 
APPENDIX B . 
\ 
REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN FOCUS GROUP AND SURVEY 
On 11/5/08 2:48 PM, "Becky Woodrick" <rebecca.woodrick@,usm.edu> 
wrote: 
Good afternoon! 
I write to ask for your help. I've created a survey, as a part of my speech 
communication doctoral research project, which will gather information 
about USM's communication with employees during hurricane Katrina. I 
seek employees, from all corners of the campus community, to help "test 
drive" the survey. You will be asked to complete a survey, and then devote 
one hour on Wednesday, November 19 (12:10 p.m. to 12:50 p.m.), to give 
me feedback about the survey, i wil l provide you lunch if you wil l give me 
your feedback! 
If you can spare 15 minutes to fill out the survey, and then bring it with you 
Dr. Joachim's conference room on 11/19, I will be most grateful. If need 
be, I can request release time from your supervisor so you can participate . 
in the meeting. Your survey, as well as your feedback, wi l l remain 
confidential. 
FYI, your fellow employees at GCRL and at the Hattiesburg will have the 
same opportunity, on November 17 and 19. 
If you are willing to assist, please send me an email or call me at 601-266-
6804. I will see that you get a copy of the survey early next week, and ask 
that you bring it with you or+the 19th. 
Questions? Give me a call. 
Thanks much, 
Becky Woodrick 
Southern Miss AA/EEO Director 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY 
ouivey http://thinktank.groupsystems. com/opinio/s?s=45 8 7 
ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of 
Southern Mississippi 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey! Your feedback will remain confidential, and will be used not only for 
the purposes of this dissertation research project, but to aid the university in updating crisis communication efforts during 
natural disasters. When you complete and send this survey you will, by default, give your permission to participate in this 
survey, which has been approved by The University of Southern Mississippi's Human Subjects Protection Review 
Committee, Questions or concerns about this survey can be shared with Becky Woodrick by calling 601.266-6804; 
dissertation committee chair Dr. John Meyer at 601.266.4280; or by contacting the chair of the USM Institutional Review 
Board, 118 College Ave, Box 5147, Hattiesburg MS 39406 or by calling 601-266.6820. 
If your participation in this survey should create issues or concerns of a personal nature, you are invited to contact the 
director of the university's counseling center, Ms. Deena L. Crawford, for information regarding counseling referrals. Ms. 
Crawford can be reached by calling 601.266.4829. 
First, please provide some basic information about yourself: 
_j>tart j 
Powered by Opinio 
1 o f 1 4/m/?nno in-?n A M 
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purvey http://thinktank.groupsystems.eom/opinio/s 
ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of 
Southern Mississippi 
Please tell me about yourself: 
1. Work location in August 2005: 
;; i Guif Coast Research Laboratory fT; Stennis Space Center O Hattiesburg 
•0 Long Beach/Gulf Park Campus ~> Jackson County site C > Keesler AFB 
2
- # of years you have worked for USM: 
3
- I am: 
:;! Staff (n Administrator (academic and non academic) :':• Faculty 
4
- I am paid: 
-C> Bi-weekly 0j Monthly 
5- My gender is: 
:n Female fj Male 
6- My race is (Check all that apply): 
f^j White ;f?.i Afican-American IE Hispanic/Latino [O Native American O Asian 
?• My age is: 
018-25 ©26-35 @ 36-45 ©46-55 ffi 56-65 ' © 66-75 -Q 76 or better 
8- Prior to Katrina, I had experienced a hurricane(s): 
>:.> No :0 Yes (please list which one(s) & date(s): 
47% 
Powered by Opinio 
j^extj 
1 r , f 1 A It A l^f\r\f\ i n . 1 1 A "h A 
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survey http://thinktank.groupsystems.eom/opinio/s 
ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of 
Southern Mississippi 
AS YOU THINK ABOUT YOUR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THIS SURVEY, THINK ABOUT USM AS A MULTI-SITE 
UNIVERSITY. IN OTHER WORDS, GIVE ANSWERS THINKING OF USM AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST IN TERMS OF THE 
CAMPUS WHERE YOU WORK. 
PARTI 
When answering these questions, please think about your time at USM as an employee, and respond based on your job 
role/responsibilities at Southern Miss: 
9
- Where/how did you receive information directly from USM: (check all that apply) 
One Week Before Katrina 
r^F -. f^l u^M website —^Departmental ^Departmental £ j Announcements from USM given 
:
""" meeting memo to TV station(s) 
ir^ J Announcements from USM given F-i Announcements from USM given [H Landline ' ^ « „ ,_
 (---T , t , - , 
toRadioStation(s) to Newspapers) telephone 0 Cell phone fc] Info from co-workers 
•I'D Others (please describe here) 
10. ONE WEEK BEFORE KATRINA HIT: 
USM provided me, as an employee, with adequate information about Katrina: 
0 Strongly Disagree £s Disagree © Somewhat Disagree £3 Neutral 0 Somewhat Agree ® Agree 0 Strongly Agree 0 Can't Recall 
11 UP TO ONE MONTH AFTER KATRINA: 
Where/how did you receive information directly from USM:(check all that apply) 
;==*.. . „ . . , .j [ 0 Departmental W} Departmental |rj Announcements from USM given [T] Announcements from USM given 
"
J
 meeting memo to TV station(s) to Radio station(s) 
W\ Announcements from USM given F l Landline ^ ' .. , ,_ £J Others (please describe here) 
— , ... , , — . , . (LJCel phone [vj nfo from co-workers to Newspaper(s) telephone r •— 
64% _Next 
Powered by Opinio 
/ i / i n m n o I ^ . T I A * * 
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survey http.7/thinktank.groupsystems.com/opinio/s 
ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of 
Southern Mississippi 
A REMINDER: AS YOU THINK ABOUT YOUR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THIS SURVEY, THINK ABOUT USM 
AS A MULTI-SITE UNIVERSITY. IN OTHER WORDS, GIVE ANSWERS THINKING OF USM AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST 
IN TERMS OF THE CAMPUS WHERE YOU WORK. 
PART II 
12. Think back to the two week immediately after Katrina hit, and answer the following questions based on your opinion at 
that time: 
USM provided me, as an employee, with adequate 
information about my job status/security, after Katrina hrt: 
USM provided me, as an employee, with adequate 
information about receiving my next paycheck, after Katrina . 
hit: 
USM provided me adequate information about when to 
return to work, after Katrina hit: 
Strongly 
Disagree i Disagree: 
Somewhat 
•Neutral) S T ! W h a t ;Agree| Simn^ ' Can '» 
Agree Agree 
70% 
Powered by Opinio 
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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of 
Southern Mississippi 
PART III 
13
- I participated in the following USM activities, after hurricane Katrina: (Check all that appiy) 
!£] free food offered on my campus 
£Z}on-campus pick-up of my regularly scheduled paycheck 
E j meeting with Dr. Joachim at the Long Beach high school 
Ll; meeting with President Thames/Or. Joachim at the Long Beach high school 
Cil convocation with President Thames on the Hattiesburg campus 
Itlj helped with repair of employees' homes damaged by the hurricane 
tiB received help from USM employee(s) with repairs to my home/office 
E'j received temporary housing from USM 
t j received clothes, food, cleaning supplies, etc from USM-affiliated groups 
•Li Other (please describe here) 
14- Please describe anything USM did for you, as an employee, that you found particularly helpful right before Katrina hit: 
15. Please describe anything USM did for you, as an employee, that you found particularly helpful right after Katrina hit: 
88% 
Powered by Opinio 
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JEittpv/uimKtanK.groupsystems.com/opinio/s 
ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of 
Southern Mississippi 
PART IV 
When answering these questions, please think about your years/experience at USM as an employee, and respond based on 
your job role/responsibilities. Think in general terms, not just about Katrina issues: 
16. please click the option that best corresponds to your opinion: 
!
 r ? r ° n g , y "Disagreed Somewhat \ s Somewhat : r j Strongly ! 
; Disagree . a Disagree . Agree
 :.
 a
 ; Agree 
; My opinions are taken into account in the daily operations at The ; ..,.. .... 
^University of Southern Mississippi (USM). '':J '•-•' \ '•-•' '''•-• '••:' 
;My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning within USM. ; ;~\ f\ ••-'; p. ,>"-*, 
JMy actions directly contribute to safeguarding USM's continued .., .-, ^ 
-.existence as a successful university. ''-: v-"' '"-' '---1 ,;--J 
;My actions influence others to prevent significant mistakes at USM. .;--:-, f-\ .••:) ,»-;, 
:USM is very concerned about the possibility of making high risk ... ...... 
5 mistakes that would jeopardize the organization. '-•' '-J '-• i - ! 
.-USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could jeopardize the ; 
^organization. '•"--' :,--; ':J v--
:USM emphasizes maintaining effective operations. ,f-, (~) ,y-} ;--. 
!USM is committed to correcting shortcomings in their emergency .„_ ^ ... ,.; t 
; response procedures. '•-'" ^ ''-*' '•"-'•' '••-'' 
jUSM's supervisors and managers accept an employee's suggestions 
;about important issues when the employee has particular expertise in $•';. C-\ -: i;---: <;"••-. 
• that area. 
;USM often over-simplifies when communicating about complex ,r. _, ^ 
'.emergency response procedures. '"-'•' ; '''-' '• *--' '•' 
17. is there anything you would like to say about Katrina and USM's response to the hurricane, that has not been included in 
this survey? If so, please do so here. 
100% Finish 
Powered by Opinio 
l o f 1 4/10/2009 10:23 AM 
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APPENDIX D 
QUANTITATIVE DATA 
Table Al 
Perceptions of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Information 
Sources 
Email 
. Web 
Dept 
Mtg. 
Dept 
memo 
TV 
Radio 
Paper 
Land 
phone 
Cell 
Info, 
co-
worker 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(%) (%) 
Yes No 
.04 
29 
2.0 
13 
1.3 
9 
0.7 
5 
2.0 
14 
2.0 
14 
1.0 
7 
1.6 
11 
1.7 
12 
6.2 
42 
.08 
6 
10.7 
72 
11.3 
76 
11.9 
80 
9.7 
65 
10.6 
71 
11.6 
78 
11 
74 
10.9 
73 
6.4 
43 
Disagree 
(%) (%) 
Yes No 
6.1 
41 
4.0 
27 
1.6 
11 
1.1 
8 
4.3 
29 
1.9 
13 
2.2 
15 
0.8 
6 
1.0 
7 
7.3 
49 
8.3 
56 
10.4 
70 
12.8 
86 
13.3 
89 
10.0 
68 
12.5 
84 
12.2 
82 
13.6 
91 
13.4 
90 
7.1 
48 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(%) (%) 
Yes No 
6.2 
42 
3.4 
23 
2.5 
17 
1.1 
8 
4.1 
28 
1.9 
13 
2.3 
16 
1.0 
7 
1.1 
8 
6.1 
40 
5.6 
38 
8.5 
57 
9.6 
63 
10.7 
72 
8.6 
52 
10.0 
67 
9.5 
64 
10.9 
73 
10.7 
72 
6.1 
40 
Neutral 
(%) (%) 
Yes No 
9.4 
63 
5.9 
0 
4.3 
29 
2.6 
18 
6.5 
44 
4.6 
31 
3.5 
24 
2.6 
18 
2.6 
18 
10.0 
67 
8.3 
56 
11.8 
79 
13.4 
90 
15.1 
101 
11.2 
75 
13.1 
88 
14.2 
95 
15.1 
101 
15.1 
101 
7.7 
52 
Somewhat 
Agree 
(%) (%) 
Yes No 
10.0 
68 
4.1 
28 
2.0 
14 
1.0 
7 
3.8 
26 
1.7 
12 
1.4 
10 
1.0 
7 
1.0 
7 
5.2 
35 
5.3 
36 
5.9 
40 
2.0 
54 
9.1 
61 
6.2 
42 
8.3 
56 
8.6 
58 
9.1 
61 
9.1 
61 
4.9 
33 
Agi 
(%) 
Yes 
22.4 
150 
10.4 
70 
8.0 
54 
3.7 
25 
9.1 
61 
6.2 
42 
5.0 
34 
5.0 
16 
5.0 
34 
12.4 
83 
ree 
(%) 
No 
14.2 
95 
11.9 
80 
14.3 
96 
18.7 
125 
13.3 
89 
16.1 
108 
17.3 
116 
20.0 
134 
17.3 
116 
10.0 
67 
Strongly 
Agree 
(%) (%) 
Yes No 
6.1 
41 
4.3 
29 
4.1 
28 
2.2 
15 
5.8 
38 
3.8 
26 
2.0 
14 
1.9 
13 
2.0 
14 
6.4 
43 
4.1 
28 
5.9 
40 
6.1 
41 
8.0 
54 
4.4 
30 
6.4 
43 
8.2 
55 
8.3 
56 
8.2 
55 
3.8 
26 
Other 
Table A2 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Number of 
Years of Employment 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Total 
<2yrs 2 3 0 2 1 1 1 
(20%) (30%) (0%) (20%) (10%) (10%) (10%) 
3 - 1 1
 45 49 51 72 37 76 25 
y r S
 (12.7%) (13.8%) (14.4%) (20.3%) (10.4%) (21.4%) (7.0%) 
21-79 
7 10 6 9 7 17 11 
y r S
 (10.4%) (14.9%) (9%) (13.4%) (10.4%) (25.4%) (16.4%) 
5 2 4 7 4 9 3 
y r S
 (14.7%) (5.9%) (11.8%) (20.6%) (11.8%) (26.5%) (8.8%) 
10 
355 
12-20 
25 31 18 28 15 42 18 
y r S
 (14.1%) (17.5%) (10.2%) (15.8%) (8.5%) (23.7%) (10.25) 
67 
34 
3 9 y r S
 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
(0%) (25%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (50%) 
Note: N = 647 
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Table A3 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Employee 
Work Location 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Total 
Hattiesburg 64 72 61 84 54 114 44 
(13.0%) (14.6%) (12.4%) (17.0%) (11.0%) (23.1%) (8.9%) 493 
Gulf Coast 
Research ^
 2 % ) ^ g % ) ( g 6 % ) ^0.1%) (13.8%) (25.9%) (19.0%) Research
 3 4
 5 12 8 15 11 
Long 
Beach/ 
fU!fPark/ 15 19 10 15 5 17 10 
Co/ (16.5%) (20.9%) (11.0%) (16.5%) (5.5%) (18.7%) (11.0%) 
Kessler 
AFB 
lteXmiS 3 2 4 6 1 3 4 . , 
Center (13.0%) (8.7%) (17.4%) (26.1%) (4.3%) (13.0%) (17.4%) 
Note: N = 665 
Table A4 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Employee 
Pay Type 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Total 
Monthly 16 22 22 26 24 46 24 
Paycheck (8.9%) (12.2%) (12:2%) (14.4%) (13.3%) (25.6%) (13.3%) 
W M 6 9 7 4 5 7 9 3 4 4 1 0 3 4 5 48S 
Paycheck ( 1 4 - 2 % ) ( 1 5 ' 3 % ) ( 1 L 8 % ) ( 1 9 ' 2 5 ) ( 9 - 1 % ) ( 2 L 7 % ) ( L 3 % ) 
Note: N = 665 
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Table A5 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Job Security up to One Month after 
Katrina with Number of Years of Employment 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
< 2
 0 1 0 1 1 2 3 9 
y r S
 (0%) (11.1%) (0%) (11.1%) (11.1%) (22.2%) (33.3%) (1.3%) 
3-
11 27 43 24 34 28 113 103 11 383 
yrs (7%) (11.2%) (6.2%) (8.8%) (7.3%) (29.5%) (26.9%) (2.8%) (54.9%) 
12-
20 8 18 13 20 21 49 58 2 189 
yrs (4.23) (9.5%) (6.8%) (10.5%) (11%) (25.9%) (30.6%) (1%) (27.1%) 
21-
29 3 9 5 5 7 25 22 2 78 
yrs (3.8%) (11.5%) (6.4%) (6.4%) (8.9%) (32%) (28.2%) (2.5%) (11.2%) 
30-
38 2 3 0 4 1 16 7 1 34 
yrs (5.8%) (8.8%) (0%) (11.7%) (2.9%) (47%) (20.5%) (2.9%) (4.9%) 
39 
yrs 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 5 
+ (0%) (0%) (0%) (20%) (0%) (20%) (60%) (0%) (.7%) 
Note: N = 698 
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Table A6 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Job Security up to One Month after 
Katrina with Employee Work Location 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral 
Disagree Disagree 
N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
Hattiesburg 31 62 36 56 156 44 • 138 • 14 537 
(5.8%) (11.5%) (6.7%) (10.4%) (29.1%) (8.2%) (25.7%) (2.6%) (75.1%) 
GulfCoast 2 3 0 4 5 21 23 0 58 
Research (3.49%) (5.175) (0%) (6.89%) (8.62%) (36.205) (39.7%) (0%) (8.1%) 
Lab 
Long 
Beach/ 
GulfPark/ 6 9 5 5 8 22 40 1 96 
Jackson (6.25%) (9.3%) (5.2%) (5.2%) (8.33%) (22.9%) (41.6%) (1.04%) (13.4%) 
Co./ 
Kessler 
AFB 
Stennis 2 2 1 4 0 13 2 0 24 
Space (8-3o/o) (83o/o) (4-1o/o) (66o/o) (9o/o) (54.10/^ ( 8 3o/o) (Q0/O) (3 4O/O) 
Center 
Note: N = 715 
Table A7 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Job Security up to One Month after 
Katrina with Employee Pay Type 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Agree Strongly Can't Total 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Recall 
N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N (%) 
Monthly 22 30 13 29 27 83 69 3 276' 
Paycheck (8.0%) (10.9%) (4.72%) (10.5%) (9.8%) (30.1%) (25.0%) (1.1%) (38.4%) 
?!" , . 19 46 29 40 32 129 134 13 442 
Pacheck ( 4 3 % ) (1 0-4 3 %) (6-6%) (9-0%) (7-21%) (29.2%) (30.3%) (2.9%) (61.6%) 
Note: N = 718 ' ~~ 
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Table A8 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Paycheck Retrieval up to One 
Month after Katrina with Number of Years of Employment 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
< 2
 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 9 
y r s
 (0%) (11.1%) (11.1%) (22.2%) (0%) (22.2%) (0%) (1.3%) 
3
~ 26 29 30 38 24 119 96 22 383 
(6.7%0 (7.5%) (7.8%) (9.8%) (6.2%) (30.9%) (25%) (5.7%) (54.9%) 
l2
~ 6 15 18 20 12 67 51 10 189 
(3.1%) (7.9%) (9.5%) (10.5%) (6.3%) (35.4%) (26.9%) (5.2%) (27.1%) 
2l
Q 3 6 3 6 7 23 19 11 78 
9
 (8.8%) (7.6%) (3.8%) (7.6%) (8.9%) (29.4%) (24.3%) (14%) (11.2%) 
30
~ 2 3 0 3 2 13 8 3 34 
3 8
 (5.8%) (8.8%) (0%) (8.8%) (5.8%) (38.2%) (23.5%) (8.8%0 (4.9%) 
3 9
 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 5 
^
s
 (0%) (0%) (0%) (20%) (0%) (0%) (60%) (20%) (.7%) 
Note: N = 698 
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Table A9 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Paycheck Retrieval up to One 
Month after Katrina with Employee Work Location 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
Hattiesbure 2 8 4 3 3 4 5 6 2 9 1 8 1 1 2 6 4 1 5 3 8 
s
 (5.2%) (8.0%) (6.31%) (10.4%) (5.4%) (33.6%) (23.4%) (7.6%) (75.1%) 
Gulf Coast 3 1 1 4 5 20 23 1 58 
Research (5.17%) (1.72%) (1.72%) (6.895) (5.2%) (34.4%) (39.6%) (1.72%) (8.1%) 
Lab 
Long 
Beach/ 
GulfPark/ 7 5 10 5 8 26 31 4 96 
Jackson (7.3%) (5.2%) (10.4%) (5.2%) (8.3%) (27%) (33.2%) (4.1%) (13.4%) 
Co./ 
Kessler 
AFB 
Stennis 3 0 2 3 2 10 3 1 24 
Space (12.5) (0%) (8.3%) (12.5%) (8.3%) (41.6%) (12.5%) (4.1%) (3.4%) 
Center 
Note: N = 716 
Table A10 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Paycheck Retrieval up to One 
Month after Katrina with Employee Pay Type 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
Monthly 23 25 10 28 23 88 61 18 276 
Paycheck (8.3%) (9.1%) (3.6%) (10.2%) (8.3%) (31.9%) (22.0%) (16.5%) (38.4%) 
B i
" 16 29 32 43 22 149 122 30 443 
Weekly (36o/o) ( 6 5o / o) ( 7 2%) (9.7%) (5.0%) (33.6%) (27.5%) (6.89%) (61.6%) 
Paycheck 
Note: N = 719 
Table A l l 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Return-to-Work Date up to One 
Month after Katrina with Number of Years of Employment 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neutral 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
<2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 9 
y r s (11.1%) (11.1%) (11.1%) (11.1%) (11.1%) (22.2%) (22.2%) (0%) (1.3%) 
3- 32 38 23 24 44 120 100 3 384 
11 (8.3%) (9.8%) (5.9%) (6.25%) (11.4%) (31.2%) (26%) (.7%) (55.1%) 
yrs 
12- 13 11 12 9 21 65 65 55 187 
20 (6.9%) (5.8%) (6.4%) (4.8%) (11.2%) (34.7%) (34.7%) (29.4%0 (26.8%) 
yrs 
21- 3 5 5 3 9 66 26 0 78 
29 (3.8%0 (6.4%) (6.4%) (3.8%) (11.5%) (84.6%) (33%) (0%) (11.2%) 
yrs 
30- 2 2 1 1 1 19 8 0 34 
38 (5.8%) (5.8%) (2.9%) (2.9%) (2.9%) 55.8%) (23.5%) (0%) (4.9%) 
yrs 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 
yrs (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%0 (100%) (0%) (.7%) 
Note: N = 697 
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Table A12 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Return-to-Work Date up to One 
Month after Katrina with Employee Work Location 
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
N (%) N (%) 
Somewhat Neutral 
Disagree 
N (%) N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Can't 
Recall 
N (%) 
Total 
Hattiesburg 35 33 43 32 59 184 147 2 535 
(6.5%) (6.2%) (8.0%) (6.0%) (11.2%) (34.4%) (27.5%) (.4%) (75.0%) 
GulfCoast 3 2 3 3 4 22 21 0 58 
Research (5.2%) (3.4%) (5.2%) (5.2%) (6.9%) (37.9%) (36.2%) (0%) (8.1%) 
Lab 
Long 
Beach/ 
Gulf Park/ 10 12 6 2 11 22 31 2 96 
Jackson (10.4%) (12.5%) (6.3%) (2.08%) (11.5%) (22.9%) (32.3%) (20.8%) (13.4%) 
Co./ 
Kessler 
AFB 
Stennis 4 1 0 3 1 11 4 0 24 
Space (16.7%) (4.2%) (0%) (12.6%) (4.2%) (45.8%) (16.7%) (0%) (3.4%) 
Center 
Note: N = 713 
Table Al3 
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Return-to-Work Date up to One 
Month after Katrina with Employee Pay Type 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Agree 
Disagree Disagree Agree 
N ( % ) N ( % ) N(%) N(%) N ( % ) N ( % ) 
Strongly Can't Total 
Agree Recall 
N (%) N (%) 
Monthly 26 24 17 12 31 88 77 1 276 
Paycheck (9.4%) (8.7%) (6.2%) (4.3%) (11.2%) (31.9%) (27.9%) (.4%) (38.5%) 
Bi- 26 34 25 29 46 152 126 3 440 
Weekly (5.9%) (7.7o/o) ( 5 7 o / o ) ( 6 6o/o) (10.5%) (34.5%) (28.6%) (.7%) (61.5%) 
Paycheck 
Note: N = 716 
Table A14 
135 
High Reliability Organization Scale Frequency Distribution 
10 
11 
14 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
70 
Total 
Frequency 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
6 
2 
6 
6 
10 
7 
7 
8 
16 
11 
19 
15 
30 
11 
21 
24 
22 
23 
18 
23 
28 
27 
28 
24 
20 
32 
20 
25 
23 
12 
21 
14 
18 
7 
4 
7 
8 
6 
1 
1 
1 
2 
633 
Percent (%) 
.2 
.2 
.2 
.2 
.3 
.6 
.2 
.5 
.3 
.3 
.2 
.9 
.3 
.9 
.9 
1.6 
1.1 
1.1 
1.3 
2.5 
1.7 
3.0 
2.4 
4.7 
1.7 
3.3 
3.8 
3.5 
3.6 
2.8 
3.6 
4.4 
4.3 
4.4 
3.8 
3.2 
5.1 
3.2 
3.9 
3.6 
1.9 
3.3 
2.2 
2.8 
1.1 
.6 
1.1 
1.3 
.9 
.2 
.2 
.2 
.3 
100 
Table Al 5 
Crosstabulation of High Reliability Organization Ranges with Range of Years of 
Employment 
<2yrs 3-11 yrs 12-20 yrs 21-29 yrs 30-38 yrs 39yrs+ Total 
Very Low (10-24) 
Low (25-39) 
High (41-55) 
Very High (56-70) 
Total 
Table A16 
0 
1 
2 
5 
8 
8 
72 
182 
75 
337 
4 
30 
99 
36 
169 
0 
12 
37 
20 
69 
1 
4 
21 
6 
32 
0 
0 
2 
1 
3 
13 
119 
343 
143 
618 
Crosstabulation of High Reliability Organization Ranges with Employee Work Location 
1 2 3 4 Total 
Very Low (10-24) 
Low (25-39) 
High (41-55) 
Very High (56-70) 
Total 
13 
92 
266 
101 
472 
0 
9 
33 
13 
55 
0 
19 
40 
22 
81 
1 
3 
9 
9 
22 
14 
123 
348 
145 
630 
Note: 1 = Hattiesburg 
2 = Gulf Coast Research Laboratory 
3 = Long Beach/Gulf Park/Jackson Co./Keesler AFB 
4 = Stennis Space Center 
Table A17 
Crosstabulation of High Reliability Organization Ranges with Employee Pay Type 
Monthly Bi-Weekly Total 
Very Low (10-24) 
Low (25-39) 
High (41-55) 
Very High (56-70) 
Total 
4 
32 
87 
34 
157 
10 
91 
262 
111 
474 
14 
123 
349 
145 
631 
137 
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